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Abstract 
 
Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of 
psychological science. With the advent of neuroimaging techniques in the early 1990’s and a 
surge of studies in affective neuroscience in recent years, scientists are now poised to answer 
this question. In this paper, I present the most up-to-date and statistically advanced meta-
analytic summary of the human neuroimaging literature on emotion.  I compare the 
locationist approach (i.e., that emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to 
distinct brain regions) with the psychological construction approach (i.e., that emotions are 
constructed of more general brain networks not specific to emotions) to better understand 
the brain basis of emotion.  I begin by outlining the set of brain regions consistently 
activated across all studies of emotion experience and perception. I next report findings 
from two sets of analyses probing the brain basis of discrete emotion categories. The first 
types of analysis demonstrates the brain regions that are consistently associated with the 
experience and perception of anger, disgust, fear, happiness and sadness across studies. The 
second type of analysis demonstrates the mental states (e.g., emotion experience or 
perception, cognitive load, locus of attention, mental response to methods, etc.) that are 
consistently associated with activity in given brain locations across studies.  Overall, there 
was little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be localized consistently and 
specifically to individual brain regions. Instead, I found evidence that is consistent with a 
psychological construction approach to the mind: a set of common processes corresponding 
 
 
to interacting brain networks constitute emotion experience and perception across a range of 
emotion categories.   
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“…of two things concerning the emotions, one must be true. Either separate and 
special centres, affected to them alone, are their brain-seat, or else they correspond 
to processes occurring in the motor and sensory centres already assigned…” 
       (James, 1890, p. 473) 
 
 
At the turn of the 19th century, William James asked how emotions were created by 
the brain. In this paper, I statistically summarize the last two decades of neuroimaging 
research on emotion in an attempt to answer this question. I examine the utility of two 
different brain-based approaches to understanding emotion. The locationist account assumes 
that all mental states belonging to the same category (e.g., “fear”) are produced by brain 
activity that is consistently and specifically associated with an architecturally defined locale 
(e.g., the amygdala), and that mental states belonging to different categories (e.g., “anger,” 
“sadness,” and “disgust”) are associated with brain activity in different locales (e.g., the 
orbitofrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, the insula). A psychological constructionist 
account, in contrast, assumes that all mental states (regardless of which emotion category 
they belong to) are realized by interacting brain networks that are not functionally specific to 
any emotion category or even to the category “emotion” itself.  These brain networks 
correspond to more basic functions or ingredients of the mind, such as processing sensory 
information from the body (experienced as core affect), making meaning of sensory signals, 
language and executive control. In this paper, I use a meta-analysis of the human 
neuroimaging literature on emotion to compare locationist and constructionist approaches 
to the brain basis of emotion. Although other theoretical models dealing with the nature of 
emotion exist (such as social constructionist and appraisal approaches), they have yet to 
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inspire neuroscientific investigations and so I do not review them here. I begin the paper 
with a brief theoretical summary of the locationist and psychological constructionist 
approaches and outline the specific hypotheses being evaluated.  Next, I review how each 
approach has fared with previous meta-analyses of the neuroimaging literature on emotion. 
Finally, I present the present meta-analytic findings summarizing all neuroimaging studies on 
the experience and perception of “anger,” “fear,” “disgust,” “happiness” and “sadness” 
published between 1993 and the end of 2007. This is the first paper using a new and 
improved statistical method to explicitly evaluate the brain basis of discrete emotions. I 
specifically evaluate the locationist approach by examining whether discrete emotion 
categories consistently and specifically activate certain brain regions, and discuss the 
relevance of these findings to a psychological construction approach. I next review other 
brain regions found to be consistently activated across emotion categories, bearing on the 
constructionist approach.  In the process, I also report whether methodological variables 
influence the meta-analytic findings in any significant way.  I close the paper by locating the 
results in the broader science of emotion, and discuss how this meta-analytic approach 
places scientists one step closer to understanding the complexities of mind-brain 
correspondence. 
The Brain Basis of Emotion 
Locationist Accounts of Emotion 
The locationist account of emotion is most clearly associated with the basic emotion 
approach.  Although basic accounts of emotion date back to the beginnings of Western 
civilization (e.g., Hippocrates’ conception of the four humors), most scientists locate their 
modern beginnings with Darwin’s (1972) The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals.  In 
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this book, Darwin used commonsense, essentialized ideas about emotion in a teleological 
fashion to support his claims about natural selection. In actuality, Darwin was not trying to 
fromulate a theory of emotion. His book was written in response to Charles Bell's (1802) 
Anatomy and Physiology of Expression, which claimed that humans have divinely created muscles 
to express their feelings (for discussion, see Gendron & Barrett, 2009; Russell, 1994). 
Nonetheless, early scientists found Darwin’s ideas inspiring and codified them into a set of 
scientific hypotheses that today ground the modern “basic emotion” approach (e.g., 
McDougall, 1908; Allport, 1924; for a discussion see Gendron & Barrett, 2009). One of 
Darwin’s lasting legacies in the field of emotion, in fact, is the assumption that specific 
expressions derive from ancient nervous system mechanisms shared with our mammalian 
cousins.  This idea, along with the idea suggested somewhat earlier by Spencer (1855) that 
responses belonging to different emotion categories are consistently and specifically caused 
by distinct brain regions, set the stage for later locationist accounts of emotion, including 
those put forth by Tomkins (1962/1963), Ekman (1972), and Panksepp (1998). Nearly a 
century later, Ekman (1999) reiterated these ideas, stating: 
“It is necessary to posit emotion-specific central nervous system (CNS) activity in my account of 
basic emotions. The distinctive features of each emotion, including the changes not just in expression 
but in memories, imagery, expectations and other cognitive activities, could not occur without central 
nervous system organization and direction. There must be unique physiological patterns for each 
emotion...”  
 
Early work in the field of medicine and behavioral neuroscience corroborated early 
philosophical and psychological locationist efforts. In 1921, Cannon famously proposed that 
the brain basis of emotion resided in the thalamus (based on investigations of cat brains and 
human cadavers). Papez (1937), Yakovlev (1948), and MacLean (1949) all expanded upon 
this finding to suggest that emotions derived from the primitive subcortical “limbic system.” 
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According to Papez, the limbic system included the hypothalamus, thalamus, 
parahippocampal gyrus, and cingulate. Yakovlev (1948) expanded Papez’s model to include 
orbitofrontal cortex, the insula, anterior temporal lobes, and amygdala. MacLean (1949) 
added the hippocampus, hippocampal gyrus, amygdala, pituitary gland, basal ganglia and 
midbrain and assimilated the “limbic system” into his concept of the “triune brain.” The 
triune brain relies on hierarchical conceptions of brain organization and function. For 
instance, homeostasis and motor function is thought to derive from the “reptilian” 
brainstem and cerebellum. Emotions are thought to derive from the limbic system, which 
presumably emerged in during the evolution of early mammals. Higher-order functions (i.e., 
cognition), including the ability to regulate the more basic functions are thought to have 
emerged with the evolutionarily “new” neocortex. Although it is now recognized that the 
triune brain concept does not best characterize brain evolution (see Streider, 2005), the idea 
that emotions derive from the subcortex (and are regulated by the cortex) is still reflected in 
some locationist accounts. Panksepp (1998; 2007), for instance, posits that emotions like 
anger, fear, lust, distress, love, joy, and expectancy derive from discrete subcortical networks 
in the mammalian brain. (For a recent discussion of the empirical standing of this model, see 
Barrett, Lindquist et al. 2007; Panksepp, 2007).  
Although differing in specifics, locationist accounts of emotion share the 
fundamental assumption that the category “emotion” and individual categories such as 
“anger,” “disgust,” “fear,” “happiness,” and “sadness” (and perhaps a few others) are 
categories that respect brain anatomy (i.e., natural kind categories; see Barrett, 2006a for a 
discussion). Over the past two decades, the cognitive neuroscience literature has made 
vigorous efforts to identify the consistent and specific brain basis for discrete categories of 
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emotion (see Calder, 2003).  These efforts have been inspired, in large part, by behavioral 
neuroscience research in animals that has carefully mapped the circuitry for particular action 
patterns (e.g., freezing, attack, vocalizations).  Table 1 lists the specific locationist 
hypotheses. I focus only on the hypotheses that have been the target of intense scientific 
inquiry, namely the amygdala-fear, insula-disgust, OFC-anger, and ACC-sadness hypotheses.1 
Important empirical findings ground each hypothesis.  
The Amygdala-Fear Hypothesis 
The amygdala is a small, almond shaped structure deep within the temporal lobe (see 
Figure 1, inset 1).  The first animal work to suggest a role for the amygdala (and the temporal 
lobe more generally) in emotion found that monkeys increased exploratory behavior and 
were less cautious of novelty following temporal lobectomies (Kluver & Bucy, 1937). The 
hypothesis that the amygdala is the brain locus of fear was most clearly popularized by 
behavioral neuroscience work showing that the amygdala plays a role in the blood pressure 
and heart rate changes involved in “fear learning” (i.e., classical conditioning; when rats 
                                                 
1 I do not discuss a locationist hypothesis of happiness because a clear locationist hypothesis has yet to emerge 
in the literature. Recent meta-analytic evidence has linked happiness to the dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex/dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (DMPFC/dACC) (Murphy et al. 2003) and basal ganglia (Phan et al. 
2002) (other meta-analyses link happiness to a number of different brain regions but for the sake of brevity, I 
do not innumerate those brain regions here; see Fusar-Poli, et al. 2008; Vytal & Hamann, in press). One recent 
hypothesis has linked the ventral striatum to happiness (Kringelbach & Berridge, 2009). This hypothesis derives 
from findings in rats and humans linking the ventral striatum to reward and hedonic pleasure (see Berridge & 
Kringelbach, 2008 for a review). It remains unclear from the evidence that the ventral striatum is specific to 
hedonic pleasure, however, never mind happiness. Accumulating evidence suggests that the mesolimbic 
dopamine system (of which the ventral striatum is a part, is involved in directing attention to and modulating 
behavioral responses to a range of aversive, novel, and appetitive stimuli (for a review, see Grillner, Hellgren, 
Menard, & Saitoh, 2005). The mesolimbic dopamine system is also involved in gating attention to novel, 
salient, or unexpected environmental events that require an effortful response (e.g., Berridge & Robinson, 
1998; Horvitz, 2000, 2002; Salamone, Correa, Farrar, & Mingote, 2007; Salamone, Correa, Mingote, & Weber, 
2005; Schultz, Apicella, & Ljungberg, 1993; Wise, 2005). Even the nucleus accumbens, which has been 
consistently linked to pleasant hedonic states (see Kringelbach & Berridge, 2009) has aspects that are involved 
in avoidance-related behaviors (Reynolds & Berridge, 2002; 2003). The cells of the nucleus accumbens cell have 
a flexible, context-specific mapping such that those cells which respond to aversive cues in a stressful 
environment also respond to appetitive cues in a safe environment (Reynolds & Berridge, 2008).  
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freeze in response to a tone that has been previously paired with electric shock; LeDoux et 
al. 1983; 1985; 1990; for reviews see Fanselow & Poulous, 2005; Fendt & Fanselow, 1999; 
LeDoux, 2007; Ohman, 2009) or “fear potentiated startle” (when rats show an enhanced 
startle response to said tone; Davis, 1992; Hitchcock & Davis, 1986; 1987; see Davis et al. 
2008; Fendt & Fanselow, 1999). The amygdala-fear hypothesis was further strengthened by 
evidence that humans show increased amygdala activity during aversive learning (LaBar et al. 
1998). Individuals with amygdala lesions (LaBar et al. 1995) or atrophy (Bechara et al. 1995) 
show impaired skin conductance responses to neutral tones that were previously paired with 
noxious noise blasts (i.e., impaired “fear learning”) and have difficulty perceiving fear in 
voices (Brierley et al. 2004; Scott et al. 1997, but see Adolphs & Tranel, 1999; Anderson & 
Phelps, 1998), bodies (Sprengelmeyer et al. 1999; but see Atkinson et al. 2007), and faces 
(e.g., Adolphs et al. 1994; 1995; 1999; although see Adolphs et al. 2005 for an alternate 
account, also discussed in the Amygdala-Salience Hypothesis below). Finally, the amygdala is 
implicated in psychopathology involving the experience of fear and anxiety (for a review see 
Damsa et al. 2009; for a meta-analytic review, see Etkin & Wager, 2007).  
The Insula- Disgust Hypothesis 
The insula is an extension of the claustrum, a section of ancient cortex, and is 
generally involved in representing sensory cues from the body (Craig, 2002, 2009) (see Figure 
1, inset 2). The granular posterior section of the insula contains a somatotopic map of the 
body (e.g., Brooks et al. 2005; Hua et al. 2005).   The agranular anterior aspect of the insula is 
important for representing sensory information from the viscera. It is paralimbic cortex and 
contains primary cortical regions for representing taste and smell.  The dysgranular anterior 
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aspect is evolutionarily more recent (and perhaps unique in humans), and is involved in 
interoception and the representation of conscious feelings (see Craig, 2002, 2009).  
The insula – disgust hypothesis originates in the belief that disgust evolved from a 
primitive food rejection reflex (Rozin et al. 2000) or aversion to disease-threat (e.g., Curtis et 
al. 2004) (with the assumption that both involve cues from the body). The insula’s role in 
disgust has not been investigated using animal models to date.  The empirical evidence that 
supports the insula-disgust hypothesis instead derives from research with humans (e.g., Jabbi 
et al. 2008; Wicker et al. 2003; see Calder et al. 2001; Calder, 2003 for reviews). Individuals 
with damage to the insula and basal ganglia have difficulty perceiving disgust in facial and 
vocal caricatures (Adolphs et al. 2003; Calder et al. 2000). Such individuals also report 
experiencing less disgust in response to scenarios about body products, envelope violation, 
and contamination (which typically evoke disgust in people with intact insulas) (Calder et al. 
2000). Individuals with Huntington’s and Parkinson’s disease (neurodegenerative diseases 
affecting the insula and basal ganglia) show diminished experiences of disgust to foul 
smelling odors (Mitchell et al. 2005) and have difficulty perceiving disgust in the faces of 
others (e.g., Sprenglemeyer et al. 1996; 1998; Suzuki et al. 2006; Kipps et al. 2007; see Calder 
et al. 2001; Sprengelmeyer, 2007 for reviews). (Although of note, other studies have found a 
decrement in emotion perception more generally, e.g., Milders et al. 2003).  
The Orbitofrontal Cortex-Anger Hypothesis 
The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) includes both paralimbic, granular, and dysgranular 
cortex in Brodmann’s areas 47/12, 11, 13, 14, and 10. (see Öngür et al. 2003).   The lateral 
OFC (lOFC) consists of areas 47/12, 11l, 13l and 13m (see Figure 1, inset 3; Figure 2; purple 
areas). At its posterior border, lOFC is contiguous with the anterior insula and extends 
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laterally to the frontal operculum. The lOFC has connections to the secondary association 
areas for all sensory modalities (e.g., Carmichael & Price, 1995a; see Kringelbach & Rolls, 
2004) and to limbic areas including the cortical aspects of the amygdala (e.g., basolateral 
complex; e.g., Carmichael & Price, 1995b).  The medial OFC (mOFC), sometimes called 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), consists of areas 10m, 10p, 14r and 11m (Öngür et 
al., 2003) (see Figure 2; blue areas). The mOFC has robust reciprocal connections to all 
limbic areas (including many nuclei within the amygdala and the ventral striatum), as well as 
to the hypothalamus, midbrain, brainstem and spinal cord areas that are involved in 
viceromotor control (e.g., Carmichael & Price, 1995a; Eblen & Graybiel, 1995; Ongür & 
Price, 1998; 2000; Rempel-Clower & Barbas, 1998; see Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004 for a 
review).  
Primary support for the OFC-anger hypothesis derives from prior meta-analytic 
reviews of the neuroimaging literature that found consistent OFC activation across studies 
of anger (Murphy et al. 2003; Vytal & Hamann, in press). These findings are consistent with 
the electroencephalography (EEG) literature linking electrical activity in left prefrontal 
cortex to anger and approach motivation. For instance, activity in left prefrontal cortex is 
associated with the experience of anger in response to an insult (Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 
2001), with an increased tendency to retaliate towards another person following an insult (by 
allocating him a dose of unpleasant hot sauce in a putative taste test; Harmon-Jones & 
Sigelman, 2001), and with high levels of self-reported trait anger and aggression (Harmon-
Jones & Allen, 1998).   
Lesion studies in animals and humans have also been cited as evidence for an OFC-
anger hypothesis (see Murphy et al. 2003). It remains unclear that these studies offer strong 
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support for a locationist hypothesis of anger, however. Most studies find that monkeys are 
more aggressive towards humans (Raleigh et al. 1979) and are more likely to threaten other 
monkeys (Deets et al. 1970; Machado & Bachevalier, 2006) following OFC lesions, implying 
that the OFC is not necessary to (i.e., does not generate) aggression. Only several studies 
find that lesions to lOFC and mOFC reduce aggressive behavior in monkeys (towards 
humans; Butter & Snyder, 1972; Kamback, 1973; and other monkeys, Raleigh et al. 1979). 
The findings in rats mirror the majority of the monkey findings. Although aggressive 
behavior is associated with increased activity in rat ventral forebrain (including the OFC) 
(Ferris et al. 2008; Halász et al. 2006), lesions to large swaths of the OFC increase the 
tendency that a rat will aggress against other rats that enter its home cage (e.g., de Bruin et al. 
1983).  
This pattern of findings is also reflected in studies of humans lesion patients and 
humans with pathology targeting the OFC. A large literature links vmPFC (including 
mOFC) damage to socially aberrant behavior (e.g., Eslinger & Damasio, 1985; Saver & 
Damasio, 1991). Individuals with vmPFC lesions become frustrated more easily and engage 
in more verbal (but not physical) aggression than do neurologically intact healthy control 
subjects (Grafman et al. 1996). Psychopathy and antisocial disorder are marked by increased 
aggression and correspond to structural (e.g., Raine et al. 2000) and functional (e.g., Harenski 
et al. 2009; Glenn et al. 2009) changes to mOFC (for a recent meta-analysis, see Yang & 
Raine, 2009). Fewer studies have linked lOFC to aggressive behavior, but one study found 
that individuals with borderline personality disorder who have lowered baseline lOFC (BA 
47) activity are more likely to aggress against others (Goyer et al. 1994).  
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Together, the lesion and human pathology findings call into question the idea that 
the OFC is the brain seat (i.e., generates) aggression/anger. Should the OFC be consistently 
and specifically implicated in anger, then these findings would instead imply that it plays a 
role in the regulation or gating of behavioral responses associated with anger. One goal of 
this meta-analytic review will thus be to test this provisional OFC-anger account. 
The ACC-Sadness Hypothesis 
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is an area of agranular cortex that wraps around 
the corpus callosum along the medial wall at the front of the brain. The ACC consists of a 
ventral surface (vACC; including BAs 24a, b, 25 and 32) that is divided into subgenual and 
pregenual portions, as well as a dorsal surface (dACC; including BAs 24a’, b’, c’ and 32’) 
(Bush et al. 2000; Paus, 2001) (see Figure 1, inset 4 and Figure 3). The vACC controls 
autonomic responses via connections with the amygdala, PAG, brainstem motor nuclei and 
the spinal cord (Devinsky et al. 1995; Vogt et al. 1992). Electrical stimulation of the vACC in 
human and non-human primates activates a range of autonomic functions including 
cardiovascular, respiratory, digestive, thermoregulatory, and endocrine systems (see Devinksy 
et al. 1995 for a review). The dACC, on the other hand, has connections to executive 
attention and motor control regions such as the dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex and supplementary motor area (e.g., Barbas & Pandya, 1989; see Devinsky et al. 1995 
for a review).  
The ACC-sadness hypothesis, like the OFC-anger hypothesis, derives primary 
support from prior meta-analyses of the neuroimaging literature (e.g., Murphy et al. 2003; 
Phan et al. 2002). Little research in animal links the ACC to sadness. Panksepp (1998, 2007) 
lists the ACC as part of the mammalian brain circuit for “distress” due to its role in 
11 
 
producing vocalizations in infant animals that have been removed from the nest (although 
the specificity of this relationship is in question; see Blumberg & Sokoloff, 2001). Some 
support for an ACC-sadness hypothesis derives from the human lesion literature. Individuals 
with dACC lesions (including dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, BA 9) are hypersensitive and 
more likely to cry at sad events than are individuals with intact dACCs (Hornak et al. 2003). 
Perhaps the most-cited evidence for an ACC-sadness hypothesis stems from studies of 
depression. Clinical depression is marked by structural and functional changes in vACC (see 
Gotlib & Hamilton, 2008 for a review), although clinical depression admittedly involves 
many symptoms above and beyond the experience of sadness (see Coyne, 1984). 
Furthermore, the vACC is hyper-activated during mania (see Fountoulakis et al. 2008), 
calling into question the specificity of this structure’s role in sadness or even negative affect. 
In reference to these clinical findings, it is interesting that electrical stimulation of the vACC 
(BA 25) relieves intractable depression by reducing feelings of apathy and anhedonia, 
normalizing sleep disturbances and decreasing gross motor impairments (e.g., Mayberg et al. 
2005). One goal of this meta-analytic review will thus be to test this provisional ACC-
sadness account. 
Psychological Constructionist Accounts of Emotion 
Psychological constructionist accounts of emotion date back to the beginning of 
psychological writings on emotion (Wundt, 1897; James, 1884). These psychological 
construction accounts, as well as those that followed, all share the basic assumption that 
emotions are psychical compounds constructed out of more basic psychological ingredients 
that are not themselves specific to emotion.  One primary ingredient in all psychological 
construction models of emotion is some form of information from the body. James (1884) 
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emphasized the importance of raw sensory processing of somatic, visceral, vascular and 
motor cues from the body as the basic building block of emotion (see also Duffy, 1957; 
Mandler, 1975, 1990; and Schachter & Singer, 1962 who referred to this ingredient as 
“arousal”). Wundt (1897) focused on the mental representation of those internal cues, which 
he called “affect” (see also Barrett 2006b; Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Harlow & Stagner, 
1932; Hunt, 1941; Russell, 2003).  Psychological construction accounts do not simply reduce 
emotion to affect, however (as is often claimed in summaries of so-called “dimensional 
models of emotion”; e.g., Keltner et al. 2003).  Typically, these models include a second 
ingredient, which is a process by which internal sensory or affective states are made 
meaningful (i.e., as related to or caused by the external surroundings).  It has been proposed 
that this meaning analysis is the result of ideas (Wundt, 1897), social referencing (Schachter 
& Singer, 1962), attribution (Russell, 2003), or categorization (Barrett, 2006a, b; Barrett, 
Lindquist, & Gendron, 2007). This meaning analysis of the body is assumed to proceed 
automatically with little sense of agency or effort.  As discussed below, the most recent 
psychological constructionist model proposed two additional ingredients that are important 
to emotion: language for emotion (Barrett, Lindquist, & Gendron, 2007) and executive 
attention (Barrett, 2009a; Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004). 
In some models, psychological ingredients combine in stages (e.g., Wundt, 
1897/1998; Schachter & Singer, 1962; Russell, 2003).  In other models they combine and 
constrain one another like ingredients in a recipe, influencing and shaping one another in 
real time (Barrett, Lindquist et al. 2007). It is hypothesized that this process is smoothly 
managed smoothly by executive attention (Barrett, 2009a; Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004). 
Emergent psychological construction models view emotions as more than the sum of their 
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parts (e.g., Wundt, 1897). Elemental psychological construction models, on the other hand, 
ontologically reduce emotion to their more basic psychological ingredients (e.g., Duffy, 1957; 
James, 1884; Russell, 2003). In all psychological construction models, the ingredients that 
constitute the psychological states that people colloquially refer to as “emotion” also 
constitute other mental states that people refer to as “cognitions” (e.g., thoughts, beliefs, and 
memories; Duncan & Barrett, 2007). 
William James framed the question of brain-emotion correspondences when he 
wrote “A science of the relations of mind and brain must show how the elementary 
ingredients of the former correspond to the elementary functions of the latter.” (1890/1998, 
p. 28). For the most part, however, psychological construction models of emotion have not 
included specific hypotheses about brain-emotion correspondences. Over the past several 
years, my lab has developed a psychological construction model that outlines a specific set of 
hypotheses for mapping brain states to psychological categories such as “emotion,” “anger,” 
“sadness,” “fear,” “disgust”, and “happiness” (Barrett, 2006a, b, 2009a, b; Barrett, Lindquist, 
Bliss-Moreau, Duncan, Gendron et al. 2007; Barrett, Lindquist, & Gendron, 2007; Barrett, 
Mesquita, Oschner & Gross, 2007; Gendron & Barrett, 2009; Lindquist & Barrett, 2008). 
Our model assumes that complex psychological categories are not natural kind categories 
that are respected by brain anatomy (or that can be distinguished from one another by a 
correlated set of measurable features such as facial behaviors, peripheral physiology, etc.; for 
empirical reviews, see Barrett, 2006a; Barrett, Lindquist et al., 2007; Barrett & Wager, 2006).  
Instead, we hypothesize that each psychological category (e.g., “emotion”) corresponds to a 
functional “neural reference space.” According to Gerald Edelman (1989) who coined the 
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term, a “neural reference space,” refers to the neuronal workspace that implements the 
collection of brain states corresponding to a class of mental events.  
Taking inspiration from connectionist and network approaches to the brain (e.g., 
Büchel & Friston, 2001; Fuster, 2006; Mesulam, 1998; Raichle & Snyder, 2007; Seeley et al, 
2007), we hypothesize that the neural reference space for discrete emotion is populated by a 
number of distributed networks that constitute the fundamental building blocks of all mental 
states. They are the constituents out of which all mental states, such as “emotions,” 
“cognitions,” and “perceptions” emerge. Each functional network is thought to correspond 
to a basic psychological ingredient that serves a more general psychological function in the 
brain. Like ingredients in a recipe, their weighting and contribution is predicted to vary 
across instances of each emotion category.  
According to our psychological construction model, there are at least four basic 
psychological ingredients that help construct emotions (and all mental states, for that 
matter). Although I only discuss four ingredients here, I do not assume that this list is 
complete or exhaustive. Similar to all other psychological construction views, the first 
hypothesized ingredient is core affect. Core affect is a neurophysiological state associated 
with changes in the core of the body. Core affect can be experienced as subjective feelings of 
pleasure or displeasure with some degree of arousal, although it need not be (Barrett & Bliss-
Moreau, 2009; Russell, 2003; Russell & Barrett, 1999). Changes in core affect are a 
homeostatic barometer – the body’s way of signaling what is valuable and what is not in 
given the context at a particular point in time.  If sensory stimulation from the outside world 
tells you what is in the environment, then core affect tells you what to do about it. Core 
affect is at the core of every emotional experience in people across the world (Mesquita, 
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2003). The concept of core affect is similar to Damasio’s concept of the “core self” 
(Damasio, 1999), Craig’s hypothesis that interoceptive sensations form the core of 
consciousness (Craig, 2009), and Cabanac’s hypothesis that affect is a common currency that 
determines the value of things in the world (Cabanac, 2002). The basic psychological 
processes that contribute to core affect and the brain regions that constitute these functional 
groups in the brain are discussed below.  
The second ingredient proposed by our model of emotion is core association. This 
ingredient corresponds to what has been called the episodic memory network (e.g., Vincent 
et al. 2006), the prospective brain (Schacter et al. 2007) and the network involved in self-
referential processing (see Mitchell, 2009), context-based predictions (Bar, 2009), and theory 
of mind (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). The regions in this network also compose a resting-state 
network called the “default network” (Raichle et al. 2001). I use the term core association 
(after Buckner and colleagues) here because this network associatively recombines prior 
experiences and is at the core of a number of mental processes including the construction of 
past experiences (as in episodic memory; see Buckner & Carroll, 2007), the construction of 
representations of the future (as in simulation; see Buckner & Carroll, 2007), and the 
categorization of exteroceptive sensations in the present (Bar, 2007). In emotion, this 
network is thought to make a prediction about what sensory input from the body means and 
what caused it (i.e., in categorizing it) (Barrett, 2006 b; 2009b).  In so doing, these brain areas 
help to realize an emotional gestalt, or what Edelman calls “the remembered present” (cf. 
Edelman, 1989; see Barrett, Mesquita et al., 2007; Barrett, 2009b).  
The third hypothesized ingredient is language. Language likely works in tandem with 
core association to flexibly make meaning of core affective states during emotional 
16 
 
experiences and perceptions (Barrett, Lindquist & Gendron, 2007). One possibility is that 
core association helps the brain make gist-level predictions about what a core affective state 
means (i.e., that negative, high arousal affect is about a stimulus in the world), whereas 
linguistic concepts are brought to bear in making more specific, fine-grained distinctions that 
produce emergent discrete emotional states (e.g., that negative, high arousal affect is about 
blocked goals; i.e., is an instance of anger).  
The fourth hypothesized ingredient is executive attention. In our psychological 
construction view, controlled attention is employed in the process of categorizing affect to 
produce an “emotional gestalt.” Executive control helps seamlessly negotiate which 
conceptual elements are activated and which are suppressed during categorization (see 
Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004, for a discussion) (c.f. Barrett, 2009b). 
In our psychological construction perspective, the functions of distinct brain areas 
are best understood in terms of which basic psychological ingredients they instantiate.  
Because the same brain region might help constitute a number of ingredients in the brain, a 
brain’s function is best conceived of in the context of the other brain areas to which it is 
connected (either anatomically or because of the timing of neural firing). The same brain 
areas might be consistently activated across a range of emotion categories (and although it is 
beyond the scope of this paper, even in non-emotional states), meaning that they are not 
specific to any emotion category (or even to emotion per se). A brain region might be 
functionally selective for a given emotion in a given instance, however. Although a brain 
region would not be considered the locus of a particular emotion, it is possible that it plays 
an important function in that emotion category because supports one of the more basic 
ingredients that contribute to the emergent emotion.    
17 
 
I next present the psychological construction hypotheses for the particular brain 
areas identified in locationist hypotheses and link them to the ingredient(s) they are 
hypothesized to support (Table 2). Following this discussion, I outline a set of brain regions 
that are not predicted a priori by locationist accounts, but that play a key role in grounding 
psychological ingredients in our psychological constructionist account. Table 3 outlines the 
ingredients and their hypothesized neural networks. 
Amygdala-Salience Hypothesis 
From a psychological constructionist view, the amygdala is part of the distributed 
network for core affect. In particular, the amygdala is involved in signaling whether 
exteroceptive sensory information has motivational salience to an organism (for similar 
views see Adolps, 2008; 2009; Duncan & Barrett, 2007; Sander et al. 2003; Whalen, 1998; 
2007). A stimulus is motivationally salient when the brain cannot easily predict its identity, its 
value in that context, the best response to deal with it, or the consequences of the response. 
Salient objects or events are affectively potent because they influence an organisms’ body 
state in a way that can be experienced as core affect (i.e., feelings of pleasure or displeasure 
with some degree of arousal) (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009). When something is salient, the 
amygdala signals other parts of the brain to sustain processing in order to learn more about 
that thing or resolve ambiguity about a behavioral response.  From a psychological 
construction point of view, “fearful” stimuli might fall into the class of uncertain and 
therefore salient stimuli, but the amygdala is not specific to the category “fear.”   
From an anatomical standpoint, the amygdala is well positioned to signal the 
presence of salient stimuli.  It projects to all but 8 cortical sites in humans (Young et al. 
1994), modulating the networks involved in processing every exteroceptive sensory modality 
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(vision, e.g., Freese & Amaral, 2006; see Amaral et al. 1992; audition, e.g., LeDoux et al. 
1991; Romanski et al. 1993; olfaction, e.g., Carmichael et al. 1994; McDonald, 1998; touch, 
e.g., Romanski et al. 1993; taste; Halsell, 1992; Norgren, 1976).  The amygdala also has 
connections to lOFC (e.g., Öngür & Price, 2000; see Pessoa, 2009), which itself projects to 
the sensory modalities. Finally, the amygdala also has strong reciprocal connections to the 
executive attention network involving the dACC (e.g., Öngür & Price, 2000; see Pessoa, 
2009) and the core association network (including the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex; 
for a review, McGaugh, 2004). The result is that the amygdala influences both what is 
attended to in the moment and what is stored in long term memory. 
Consistent with the amygdala-salience hypothesis, the amygdala is routinely 
implicated in orienting attention to salient stimuli (see Holland & Gallagher, 1999). The 
amygdala responds to stimuli that are experienced as subjectively arousing (e.g., Bradley et al. 
2001; Weierich et al. 2010), intense (e.g., Bach et al. 2008) and emotionally “impactful” (e.g., 
Ewbank et al. 2009). Novel (Breiter et al., 1996; Schwartz et al., 2003; Weierich et al. 2010; 
Wilson & Rolls, 1993; Wright et al., 2003; Wright et al., 2006; Wright et al. 2008) and 
uncertain (Herry et al. 2007) stimuli robustly activate the amygdala and produce 
cardiovascular responses associated with affective changes (Mendes et al. 2007). Amygdala 
lesions disrupt normal responses to novelty and uncertainty in mammals (e.g. Bliss-Moreau 
et al. in press; Burns et al., 1996; Mason et al., 2006; Missilin & Ropartz, 1981; Nachman & 
Ashe, 1974; for reviews, see Knight and Grabowecky, 1999; Petrides, 2007).  Finally, 
amygdala responses habituate rapidly, even in the continued presence of salient stimuli like 
fearful faces (Breiter et al. 1996; Büchel et al. 1999; Fischer et al. 2003; Whalen et al. 2004; 
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Wright et al. 2001). This fact calls into question the idea that the amygdala is necessary for all 
instances of fear perception or experience.   
These findings explain the amgydala’s role in “fear learning” without assuming that 
the amygdala is specific to fear.  More likely, amygdala activity reflects orienting responses 
that occur when an organism attends to neutral and salient stimuli during learning. The 
amygdala contributes to the production of the skin conductance responses (SCRs) (Laine et 
al. 2009) used to index “fear learning.” SCRs are known to covary with changes in attention 
(e.g., Blakeslee, 1979; Spinks et al. 1984), consistent with an orienting account. Furthermore, 
there is evidence that the amygdala-driven SCRs that occur during learning are linked more 
to changes in attention than anticipation of an aversive stimulus. Amygdala responses are 
associated with the SCRs that occur immediately following the onset of a conditioned 
stimulus (e.g., a tone), but not the SCRs that occur prior to the onset of the unconditioned 
stimulus (e.g., a shock) (Cheng et al. 2007).  That the amygdala is involved in attention to 
salient stimuli during learning but not fear per se would explain why the amygdala is 
activated when organisms learn that a neutral stimulus predicts reward (e.g., Paton et al. 
2006; for a review see Murray, 2007). Indeed, the amygdala is implicated in a host of 
mammalian social behaviors (e.g., male and female sexual behavior, maternal behavior, 
aggression; see Newman, 1999), probably because social stimuli are, by default, salient. 
Lastly, the amygdala-salience hypothesis helps to explain why the category “fear” is 
not always linked to amygdala response. A number of behaviors that rats perform in 
threatening contexts, such as avoiding the location of the threat (e.g., Vazdarjanova & 
McGaugh, 1998) and defensive treading (where rats kick their bedding in the direction of the 
threat; Reynolds & Berridge, 2002, 2003, 2008) are not amygdala-dependent (e.g., Kopchia et 
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al. 1992; Vazdarjanova & McGaugh, 1998). Although the amygdala is required to learn that a 
tone predicts a shock, it is not required to retain this association. Monkeys still startle at a 
tone that previously acquired aversive value even following bilateral amygdala removal (e.g., 
Antoniadis et al. 2009). In humans, the amygdala is activated more so by tasks requiring a 
person to learn the predictive value of a fearful face than by tasks where fearful faces are 
passively viewed (Hooker et al. 2006). Furthermore, the amygdala shows minimal activation 
to fearful faces with averted gazes, although such faces signal imminent danger (Adams et al. 
2003).  Instead, the amygdala routinely shows increased activation (although it is short lived; 
e.g., Fischer et al. 2003) to fearful faces with a forward gaze (where the target person is 
looking straight at the perceiver), presumably because these expressions are rare and difficult 
to interpret (Whalen et al. 2001). Even an individual with bilateral amygdala damage is 
capable of perceiving fear in posed expressions once she is explicitly directed to look at the 
eyes of target faces (Adolphs et al. 2005). She can also accurately perceive fear in faces under 
subliminal and rapid presentation latencies (e.g., Tsuchiya et al. 2009) and in bodies posed to 
depict fear (Atkinson et al. 2007). 
The Anterior Insula-Interoception Hypothesis 
 From a psychological constructionist view, the insula is not the brain locus of 
disgust, but plays a key role in representing core affective states. The insula is key node in a 
network for receiving and representing feedback from the body. To the extent that brain 
states corresponding to disgust represent a stimulus’ consequence for the body as a key 
element, the anterior insula should be activated in disgust. Indeed, a key ingredient in the 
mental states referred to as “disgust” is likely a representation of how an object will affect 
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the viscera. A psychological constructionist approach would not hypothesize that the insula 
is specific to disgust, however.  
 From an anatomical perspective (see Craig, 2002, 2003, 2008, 2009), it is easy to see 
why the anterior insula holds a key position in representing core affective feelings.  Posterior 
aspects and mid-insular cortex serve as primary and secondary sensory cortex for 
somatovisceral cues and in so doing represent interoceptive sensations from the body in a 
somatotopic manner (e.g., Brooks et al. 2005; Hua et al. 2005).  The anterior insula is 
implicated in the re-representation (i.e., subjective awareness) of these sensations (e.g., Craig 
et al. 2000; see Craig, 2002; 2003; 2009 for reviews), and shows increased activation during 
awareness of body movement (e.g., Tsakiris et al. 2007), awareness of body sensations like 
gastric distention (e.g., Wang et al. 2008), and in orgasm (e.g., Ortigue et al. 2007).  
Furthermore, there is growing evidence that the insula is a hub in a large-scale resting state 
network involved in attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Corbetta et al. 2008), suggesting 
that body-based signals constitute a form of attention in the brain (see Duncan & Barrett, 
2007 for a discussion of affect as attention).  
The OFC- Context-based Behavior Hypothesis 
 The OFC plays a role in core affect as a key node in a network that integrate sensory 
information from the world and body to guide behavior in a context-specific, goal-
dependent manner. Sensory information from the world tells an organism what is in its 
environment—sensory information from the body (experienced as core affect) tells the 
organism what to do about those things. From an anatomical standpoint, the OFC is well 
suited to guide behavior by integrating sensory information from the world and body. 
Except for the rhinal regions of the temporal lobes, the OFC is the most polymodal region 
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in the brain (cf. Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004; e.g., Barbas, 1988). Reciprocal connections 
between the OFC and gustatory, olfactory, somatosensory, auditory and visual modalities, 
along with visceral input from the insula and the thalamic nucleus, allow the OFC to unite 
diverse sources of sensory input (Rolls, 1999). The OFC has reciprocal connections to the 
amygdala (Carmichael & Price, 1996) and ACC (Van Hoesen et al. 1993), which form a 
source of attention in the brain (see sections on The amygdala-salience hypothesis and The ACC-
conflict hypothesis). The OFC also has reciprocal connections with other frontal areas such as 
BA 9 and 46 involved in executive control (Barbas & Pandya, 1989; Carmichael & Price, 
1995a) and premotor areas involved in volitional behavior (Barbas & Pandya, 1989). These 
connections, along with outputs to the hypothalamus, PAG, and ventral striatum allow the 
OFC to guide motivation and behavior (for a review of the OFC and connections see 
Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004). 
Findings linking the mOFC to decision-making (e.g., Bechara et al. 1996; 2000; 
Koenigs et al. 2007), associative learning (e.g., Rolls et al. 1994; 1996) and the valuation of 
objects (e.g., Chib et al. 2009) are consistent with an OFC-context-based behavior 
hypothesis. The inability to properly integrate exteroceptive and interoceptive information to 
guide behavior would explain why social behavior is altered in individuals with OFC lesions, 
even in the presence of preserved intelligence and executive function (e.g., Eslinger & 
Damasio, 1985;  Saver & Damasio, 1991) (for a similar view see Damasio et al. 1990). This 
hypothesis also explains the evidence linking the OFC to anger and aggression (see section 
of the OFC-Anger Hypothesis). Failure to integrate exteroceptive and interoceptive 
information will result in behaviors that are not well-tuned to the context (e.g., dysregulated 
aggression). Indeed, one account suggests that psychopaths are aggressive not because the 
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OFC is the brain seat of anger, but because an inability to learn the changing value of stimuli 
causes them frustration (Blair, 2007).  
The ACC-Conflict Hypothesis 
According to a psychological constructionist view, the ACC helps compose core 
affect in the brain as part of a network for detecting and guiding behavior in the face of 
conflicting sensory inputs (for a discussion of the ACC’s role in conflict monitoring see 
Botvinik, 2007; Bush et al. 2000). Conflict might stem from competition between different 
types of exteroceptive sensory representations (e.g., visual v. auditory representations; two 
different visual representations), or between exteroceptive sensory representations and 
interoceptive representations. One means of representing conflict in the external world is as 
core affective feelings (Botvinik, 2007; Hacjack & Foti, 2003).  
Together, the subcomponents of the ACC are anatomically well-suited for 
computing conflict and responding to conflict. The dACC is known to play an executive role 
and uses exteroceptive sensory information (via thalamic projections; Barbas et al. 1991) and 
interoceptive sensory information (from the insula; Mesulam & Mufson, 1989), to direct 
attention and motor responses via connections to DLPFC, VLPFC and SMA (e.g., Barbas & 
Pandya, 1989; see Devinsky et al. 1995; Paus, 2001 for reviews). Tasks involving conflict 
include those where individuals are asked to inhibit a prepotent motor response (such as in 
the classic “go/no go” task; e.g., Braver et al. 2001; Durston et al. 2002), to process 
competing sensory stimulus arrays (such as in the classic “Stroop” task, e.g., Botvinick et al. 
2001; Bunge et al. 2002), or tasks on which errors are made (Hajcack & Foti, 2008) (for 
reviews see Botvinick, 2007; Bush et al. 2000; Paus, 2001). One means by which the dACC 
might engage attention and influence behavior following the detection of conflict is via the 
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production of a core affective state. Consistent with this hypothesis, dACC activity correlates 
with cardiac control during cognitive tasks (Critchley et al. 2003). The dACC also likely 
accomplishes autonomic control via innervations to the vACC which in turn projects to the 
PAG, brainstem, and the spinal cord (e.g., Devinsky et al. 1995; Vogt et al. 1992). dACC 
might respond to conflict in “top-down” manner by engaging regions involved in cognitive 
control, whereas vACC might do so in a more “bottom-up” way by causing a shift in an 
organism’s core affective state.  
Other Areas in the Neural Reference Space for Discrete Emotion 
DMPFC, MTL, and Retrosplenial cortex/PCC. As part of the ingredient of core 
association, I predict that the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), medial temporal lobe 
(MTL), and retrosplenial cortex/posterior cingulate cortex will play some consistent role in 
constructing the present, in the form of momentary experiences and perceptions of emotion 
(Barrett, 2009a; Barrett & Lindquist, under review) (see Figure 4).  
ATL and VLPFC. As part of the network for language (e.g., for a review and meta-
analysis see Price, 2000 and Vigneau et al. 2006), I predict that the anterior temporal lobe 
(ATL) and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) will be part of the neural reference 
space for discrete emotion (see Figure 5).  The ATL plays an integral role in the 
representation of conceptual knowledge (Pobric et al. 2007; Lambon Ralph et al, 2009; 
Rogers et al. 2004), including the representation of abstract social concepts (e.g., Ross & 
Olson, in press; Zahn et al. 2007; 2009). Consistent with our psychological constructionist 
hypothesis that language is integral to emotion (Barrett, 2006b; 2009a; Barrett, Lindquist & 
Gendron, 2007), patients with semantic dementia have focal atrophy to the ATL and exhibit 
deficits in emotion perception (Rosen et al. 2004) and empathy (Rankin et al. 2006).  Areas 
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of the VLPFC (e.g., BA 44, 45, 46) are known to be involved in the goal-directed access to 
conceptual knowledge and selection amongst competing response representations (e.g., 
Schnur et al. 2009; Thompson-Schill, 1997; Badre & Wagner, 2007). There is also growing 
evidence that areas of VLPFC ground abstract category knowledge including feature-based 
information about categories (e.g., Freedman et al. 2002; see Miller et al. 2002). To the extent 
that language is brought to bear in the categorization of affective states during the 
construction of emotion experiences (Barrett, 2009a) these brain regions will be consistently 
activated at greater than chance levels and therefore appear as part of the neural reference 
space for discrete emotion. 
VLPFC and DLPFC. As part of the network for executive function (see Miller & 
Cohen, 2001; see Wager & Smith, 2003 for a meta-analysis), I predict that areas of lateral 
prefrontal cortex, including VLPFC and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), will be part 
of the neural reference space for discrete emotion (see Figure 6). VLPFC helps comprise this 
ingredient given its role in goal-directed retrieval of conceptual knowledge. Bilateral DLPFC 
is helps comprise this ingredient because it is implicated in working memory (for a meta-
analysis see Wager & Smith, 2003) and in the goal-directed control of attention (see Miller, 
2000). This type of goal-directed control of attention is seen in emotion regulation (e.g. 
Ochsner et al. 2004; Urry et al. 2006) but is hypothesized to be active across every moment 
of emotion as executive control modulates the activity of other psychological ingredients in 
emotion (Barrett, 2009b). 
Prior Meta-Analyses of the Brain Basis of Emotion 
Meta-analyses of the neuroimaging literature are useful for comparing the scientific 
support for both the locationist and psychological construction models of emotion for two 
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primary reasons.  First, a meta-analysis allows researchers to summarize hundreds of 
empirical studies by statistical means; this is particularly beneficial give the high rate of false-
positives and largely variable experimental and statistical methods used across individual 
neuroimaging studies (see Wager et al. 2007; Kober & Wager, in press). Not only are the 
results more reliable than the findings from any given study, but it is possible to statistically 
model the influence of these between-study methodological and statistical differences. 
Second, neuroimaging is probably the best way to test a psychological construction model, 
where the experienced content of a mental state (whether it is anger or fear, or a memory, or 
a belief) will never reveal the processes that produced or realized that state in the first place. 
It is possible to construct the experience of emotion in behavioral studies by manipulating 
core affect and emotion knowledge and measuring the resulting emotion experience (e.g., 
Lindquist & Barrett, 2008). Yet with imaging, researchers can directly unmask the ingredients 
involved in constructing an experience, even if they are not accessible to conscious 
awareness. 
Despite the obvious promise of meta-analysis for resolving questions about the brain 
basis of emotion, prior attempts to summarize the growing mass of neuroimaging studies on 
emotion have not yet realized their full potential.  At present, six published meta-analyses 
have assessed the neuroimaging literature on emotion: three assessing the locationist view 
(Fusar-Poli et al. 2008; Phan et al. 2002; Vytal & Hamann, in press), two assessing the 
psychological construction view (Kober et al., 2008; Wager et al., 2003), and one assessing 
both (Murphy et al. 2003). One examined the brain basis of emotion perception (Fusar-Poli 
et al. 2008) and the remaining five looked at a mixture of both experience and perception 
studies (Kober et al. 2008; Murphy et al. 2003; Phan et al. 2002; Vytal & Hamann, in press; 
27 
 
Wager et al. 2003). The results are largely inconsistent across meta-analyses, in large part due 
to variations in the number and nature of studies sampled and in the statistical methods 
used. See Tables 4 and 5 for a summary of the relevant findings. 
Testing Locationist Hypotheses 
To verify a locationist account of brain-emotion correspondence, it is necessary to 
show that a brain area is consistent for each discrete emotion category (for discussion see 
Barrett & Wager, 2006; Schienle & Schäfer, 2009; Vytal & Hamann, in press). Consistency 
refers to the fact that a given brain region shows increased activity for every instance of a 
discrete emotion category (e.g., the amygdala shows increased activity each and every time a 
person experiences fear). The meta-analyses examining the locationist approach to the brain 
basis of emotion were largely inconclusive about the consistency with which brain regions 
were activated for discrete emotion categories. All meta-analyses found evidence that the 
amygdala is consistently active in studies of fear (although the degree of consistency were 
less than might be expected; see Barrett & Wager, 2006).  As Table 4 indicates, this is where 
clear consensus across the meta-analyses ends. 
In addition to demonstrating consistency, it is also necessary to show that a brain 
area is specific to a given discrete emotion category (for discussion see Barrett & Wager, 
2006; Vytal & Hamann, in press). Specificity refers to the fact that a given brain region is 
active for instances of one (and only one) emotion (e.g., the amygdala does not show 
increased activity when the person is experiencing something other than fear). As 
summarized in Table 3, all four meta-analyses testing locationist hypotheses failed to find 
clear evidence for specificity in brain-emotion correspondence. First, there was lack of 
specificity across meta-analyses.  For example, Murphy et al. (2003) found that the insula was 
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activated in the category “disgust” but Vytal and Hamann (in press) found it was also 
activated in “happiness,” and “fear,” and Fusar-Poli et al. (2008) found it was activated in 
“anger.”   In addition, there was lack of specificity within a single meta-analysis.  For 
example, Murphy et al. (2003) found that the dACC was active in both “sadness” and 
“happiness.” Vytal and Hamann (in press) found that the left amygdala was consistently 
activated in “happiness,” “anger,” “fear,” and “disgust.” (For additional overlapping 
findings, see Table 2 in Vytal & Hamann, in press and Table 3 in Fusar-Poli et al. 2008). 
Although Vytal and Hamann (in press) and Fusar-Poli et al. (2008) considered their findings 
in support of a locationist approach, this lack of specificity in the brain areas associated with 
discrete emotion categories is actually more consistent with a psychological construction 
view. 
Although any meta-analysis is a herculean effort to be applauded, all four of the 
existing meta-analyses testing locationist hypotheses of emotion suffer important 
methodological drawbacks. These drawbacks very likely contributed to the inconsistency in 
their findings.  First, these meta-analytic summaries did not account for the fact that results 
from imaging studies have a nested structure (i.e., specific peak activations are nested within 
specific contrasts are nested within specific papers).  Published studies typically report a 
number of contrasts (e.g., anger vs. neutral, happy vs. neutral) and multiple locations of peak 
activation are reported for each contrast. All four meta-analyses treated the peaks within 
study contrasts as independent data points (when in fact peaks from the same study contrast 
are not independent of one another). Because individual imaging studies vary in the number 
of peak activations that they report for each contrast (in part based on the processing and 
thresholding decisions made during data analysis), small differences in the studies included in 
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a meta-analysis can produce large differences in the final results, making it difficult to 
observe consensus across meta-analyses. A number of factors influence how many peaks are 
reported by an individual study, including the sample size (i.e., power to find significant 
results), the authors’ pre-processing and statistical thresholding decisions, and whether a 
fixed or random effects analysis was used. For example, Damasio et al. (2000) reported 15 
peaks in a single sad v. neutral contrast and influenced the results over two times as much as 
Phillips et al. (1998b), who reported 6 peaks in a single sad v. neutral contrast. Ignoring the 
nested data structure allows random error to creep into the analyses, rendering results more 
variable, and ultimately making it even harder to find consensus across the meta-analyses. To 
the extent that meta-analyses have different databases, they will contain differing degrees of 
random noise that will distort their findings. Vytal and Hamann’s (in press) database 
contained more than double the number of studies in Murphy et al. (2003) and a little less 
than double the studies in Phan et al. (2002), which also means that it contains additional 
(i.e., non-overlapping) random error.  
Second, all four meta-analyses allowed individual peaks from both fixed and random 
effects analyses to contribute equally in the final empirical summary, despite the fact that 
those resulting from a random effects analysis are more generalizable to the population. This 
can also add random error to meta-analytic findings. For example, using a fixed effects 
analysis on data from 7 participants, Beauregard et al. (1998) reported 13 peaks from a sad v. 
neutral contrast. Phillips et al (1998b) reported 7 peaks from a random effects analysis of 
data from 8 participants. Although Phillips et al.’s (1998b) findings are, by definition, more 
predictive of the population, the Beauregard et al. (1998) findings would weigh more heavily 
in the final empirical summary because they reported almost twice as many peaks.  
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Testing Psychological Construction Hypotheses 
Two of the three previous meta-analyses assessed a psychological construction 
approach to emotion in that they evaluated the brain basis of only one ingredient of this 
approach: core affect. Both Murphy et al. (2003) and Wager et al. (2003) compared the brain 
basis of different psychological models of affect (i.e., positive v. negative and approach v. 
avoidance). These analyses suffer from the same limitations as those meta-analyses testing 
the locationist emotion hypotheses and produced no consistent or specific results 
(summarized in Table 5).  
To overcome the limitations of the prior work, the Barrett and Wager laboratories 
began a collaborative meta-analysis project on the brain basis of emotion in 2005.  To date, 
we have published two chapters and one paper on the functional networks existing in the 
neural reference space for emotion (i.e., the brain regions consistently involved in realizing 
all varieties of emotional and affective states; Barrett, Mesquita, Oschner, & Gross, 2007; 
Kober et al. 2008; Wager et al. 2008).  This neural reference space was derived from 
neuroimaging studies of discrete emotion and affective experience and perception published 
between 1990 and 2005.  Our meta-analysis capitalized on the hierarchical structure of 
neurimaging data (peaks nested within contrasts nested within studies), thereby correcting 
some of the statistical limitations present in other meta-analytic studies (see section entitled 
Multilevel Peak Kernel Density Analysis; also see Kober et al. 2008; Wager et al. 2007; 2008; 
Kober & Wager, in press).  We also included a measure of quality control and weighted 
studies using random effects analysis and those with larger sample sizes more heavily in the 
statistical summaries.   
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Using multidimensional scaling, we found that the neural reference space for 
emotion could be parsed into six distributed functional groups supporting a psychological 
construction approach to emotion (Kober et al. 2008). The brain areas in two of the 
functional groups (core limbic and lateral paralimbic groups) are consistently part of the core 
affect network.  Aspects of two functional groups (the medial posterior and medial PFC 
groups) are part of the core association network.  Areas in the cognitive/motor control 
cluster are consistent with the ingredients of executive control and language. In addition, a 
visual processing functional cluster was also identified as part of the neural reference space 
for emotion.  See Figure 7. In the present paper, I build and expand upon the initial efforts 
published in Kober et al. First, I updated our database to include papers from 2006 and 
2007.  This nearly doubled the number of studies in the database. Second, I sampled only 
those studies from the database investigating the experience or expression of discrete 
emotion. This allowed me to specifically examine whether discrete emotion categories can be 
localized to consistent and specific locales within the neural reference space (testing a 
locationist approach), or whether the space can be parsed into more basic psychological 
processes that are common across discrete emotion categories (testing a psychological 
construction approach).  
A Meta-analysis of Brain-Emotion Correspondence 
The present meta-analysis possesses several statistical advantages, each of which is 
outlined below. This meta-analysis is the first to explicitly use neuroimaging data to test 
locationist v. psychological constructionist views of emotion. Because a locationist account 
has strong empirical requirements (i.e., evidence for consistency and specificity in brain-
emotion correspondence), it is easier to reject and therefore could suffer a disadvantage 
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when compared to the more flexible constructionist account. I made several analysis 
decisions to adjust for this fact.  
First, I exclusively sampled studies that tested a locationist account (i.e., studies that 
explicitly search for the brain basis of discrete emotional states) which should therefore 
produce the best evidence of brain localization for different emotion categories. Second, I 
included only those studies that utilize subtraction methods. Subtraction methods reveal 
“islands” of brain activation that are maximally unique to the emotion category of interest 
and are thus more likely to support a locationist account than an account that hypothesizes 
the existence of distributed functional brain networks. Third, I only included those study 
contrasts with a neutral comparison condition, because subtractions using other emotion 
categories as a comparison condition (e.g., fear v. anger or fear v. happiness) could add noise 
to the sample and thus obscure evidence for a locationist account.  
Finally, I performed a number of statistical analyses with the potential to yield 
evidence in favor of a locationist account. I asked whether discrete emotion categories were 
consistently associated with increased activation in any brain regions more so than what 
would be expected by chance. In addition to this stringent test, I also reported a more 
lenient test which assessed whether any discrete emotion category was consistently 
associated with increased activation in any brain region relatively more than another (even if 
all emotion categories were consistently associated with an absolute increase in activity in a 
given brain region). Furthermore, I reversed the direction of inference and asked whether, 
given consistent increase in activity within a brain region across studies, people were more 
likely to be experiencing any one mental state (emotion category, affective state, mental 
response to a method variable, etc.).  
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Method 
The Database 
The present database contains 656 experimental contrasts reported in 234 PET or 
fMRI studies. Studies were sampled from all PET and fMRI studies related to emotion and 
affect that were published from 1990-2007. Papers in the present meta-analysis include those 
analyzed in Phan et al. (2003), Murphy et al. (2003), Wager et al. (2008) and Kober et al. 
(2008).  Wager et al. and Kober et al. utilized a database of studies sample from 1990-2005. 
For the present analysis, I sampled additional papers published between 2006-2007 from 
Medline, PsychInfo and Google Scholar. Only studies that used subtraction analyses and that 
reported peak activations were included. Contrasts reporting deactivations (e.g., neutral 
minus fear) were not included. Studies were disqualified from the database if the method of 
emotion induction included fear conditioning or the administration of pain. Studies assessing 
the neural correlates of learning, explicit memory, priming, error processing, emotion 
regulation/suppression, emotion anticipation and hunger or thirst (or some other bodily 
sensation; e.g., stomach distension) were not included because these phenomena were not 
deemed to be exclusively emotional. Study contrasts assessing patients, children (<18 years 
of age) or older adults (> 65 years of age) were not included in the database.  Study contrasts 
examining drug treatment, certain genotypes/phenotypes, or study contrasts where 
participants were arbitrarily split into groups (e.g., chocolate cravers v. non-cravers) were not 
included. Finally, contrasts in which ambiguous or blended emotions were perceived and 
contrasts assessing romantic love were excluded from the database. 
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Once the database was compiled, I further restricted the present analysis to studies 
targeting the experience or perception of discrete emotion (240 contrasts of anger, sadness, 
fear, disgust, and happiness from 91 studies published between 1993 and 2007). Studies of 
emotion experience were those that induced feelings through a range of sensory modalities 
including vision (e.g., pictures), olfaction (e.g., odors), memory (e.g., autobiographical recall), 
and imagery (e.g., simulation of scenarios). Studies of emotion perception were those that 
asked participants to view faces or listen to voices with emotional content. I excluded 
contrasts assessing more general affective states (pleasure, displeasure or arousal) to achieve 
the clearest test of the locationist approach to emotion. Contrasts assessing emotional states 
such as amusement, surprise, or contempt were not included in the present analysis because 
there were too few in the literature to reliably assess. Only those contrasts that used a neutral 
comparison condition (e.g., fear experience minus neutral) were included so that activation 
associated with another emotion would not influence findings (e.g., fear experience minus 
sadness experience). Of the published meta-analyses, only Fusar-Poli et al. (2008) and Vytal 
and Hamann (in press) utilized this latter criterion in defining their database; failure to 
restrict the analysis to contrasts with a neutral reference condition is a drawback of most 
other meta-analyses.  
Each study was coded for methodological variables like the induction method used 
(e.g., vision, audition, olfaction, imagery, recall), stimuli used (e.g., faces, voices, pictures, 
etc), sample size and gender break-down, and the type of statistics used (fixed v. random 
effects). Studies were also coded for a number of psychological variables such as the states 
assessed (e.g., affect v. emotion), the mode (experience v. perception), the presence of 
cognitive load (whether participants were asked to perform another task simultaneous to 
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emotion experience or perception), the object of participants’ evaluation (whether a 
participant was directed to evaluate feelings or a stimulus) and the focus of attention 
(whether emotion was foregrounded in attention, i.e., the judgment explicitly involved 
attention on emotion, or whether emotion was backgrounded in attention i.e., the judgment 
did not explicitly involve attention on emotion). Each study was coded twice for reliability by 
a set of three raters (including K.L). All raters were in perfect agreement. Once studies were 
coded, codes and MNI or Talairach coordinates were entered into an Excel database for 
each experimental contrast that passed qualification criteria. See Table 6 for studies included 
in the present analysis and the Appendix for references.  
Multilevel Kernel Density Analysis 
The database was analyzed using the Multilevel Peak Kernel Density Analysis 
(MKDA; Wager et al. 2007; http://www.columbia.edu/cu/psychology/tor/). The MKDA 
has now been used in a number of published meta-analyses of the neuroimaging literature 
(Barrett et al. 2007; Wager et al. 2007a; Nee et al. 2007; Etkin & Wager, 2007; Wager et al. 
2008; Kober et al. 2008).  The MKDA possesses a number of statistical advantages that 
make it superior to prior meta-analytic techniques. Whereas other analysis strategies compute 
the proportion of peak activations at a given location for a given category (e.g., fear), the 
MKDA allows reported peaks to be nested within a contrast for a given study and treats 
study contrast (rather than individual peaks) as the level of analysis.  So, for example, when 
Damasio et al. (2000) reported two peaks within a 10 mm radius of one another in the ACC 
for a sadness experience v. neutral contrast, , the MKDA approach would count one (rather 
than 2) activations at that location towards the final proportion estimate. As a consequence, 
the statistical dependency between peaks within a study contrast is accounted for, and no 
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single study can contribute disproportionately to the final results. The MKDA method also 
weights studies by sample size and the rigor of statistical methods used in the primary 
analysis as a means of quality control.  
A summary of the MKDA method is presented in Figure 8.  The MKDA begins by 
first creating a map plotting the peak coordinates reported in every contrast in the database. 
The MKDA then convolves each reported peak with a 10-mm 3-D kernel. The effect of this 
step is that any two peaks in a given contrast that are within 10-mm of one another get 
subsumed by the same kernel and do not count twice towards the final meta-analytic 
summary. The MKDA then computes the proportion of contrasts in the database that 
activate within 10-mm of each voxel in the entire brain. This is represented as a density map, 
or a map of proportions. To discern which proportions would be expected at a level greater 
than chance, a null distribution is computed using a Monte Carlo simulation (using 18,000 
iterations). The map of proportions is then thresholded at p<.05 using a Family-wise error 
correction. The result is the neural reference space, the set of brain regions consistently 
activated across all studies of discrete emotion experience and perception.  
Analysis Strategy 
I used two types of analyses to ascertain whether regions within the neural reference 
space for discrete emotion correspond consistently and specifically to individual emotion 
categories. The first set of analyses asked which brain regions were most likely to be active 
when a person was experiencing or perceiving a given emotion (e.g., given that a person was 
experiencing fear, what brain regions were active?). First, for each emotion category, I 
assessed whether increased activation in any brain voxels was more likely than chance to be 
associated with a specific emotion category using a χ2 test. All χ2 tests were false discovery 
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rate (FDR) corrected for multiple comparisons (FDR p < .05). I refer to these as absolute 
analyses.  
In addition, I asked the more lenient question of whether certain voxels were 
relatively more likely to show an increase in activation for one emotion category vs. the 
others (even if those voxels were more likely to show an increase in activation for more than 
one category relative to chance).  I refer to these as relative analyses.  A significant effect here 
would indicate that correspondence between an emotion category and brain region is a 
matter of degree, not kind (e.g., the amygdala might be more likely to show an increase in 
activation during the perception of all emotions but this likelihood increases by a greater 
degree during the perception of fear).  This was accomplished by contrasting the likelihood 
of increased activation associated with one category (e.g., fear experience) vs. all others (e.g., 
anger experience, disgust experience, happy experience, sad experience). I report regions 
surviving either a height-based threshold corrected at p < .05 or an extent-based threshold 
corrected at p < .001. The height-based threshold is the most spatially specific cluster-
extent-based threshold for significant consistency across studies in the MKDA analysis (i.e., 
those regions where the peak density is high enough that the null-hypothesis chances of 
finding a single significant voxel anywhere in the gray matter of the brain is p < .05).  The 
extent-based threshold (where the number of contiguous voxels above p<.001 are compared 
with the number of contiguous voxels expected by chance; see Kober et al. 2008) is set at 
the most stringent level because these clusters are the most spatially specific.  
In addition to asking “given that a person is in a particular mental state (e.g., the 
experience of anger), which voxels show a consistent and specific increase in activation?,” I 
also asked “given a significant increase in activation at this location, can I predict what type 
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of mental state the participant is likely to be in?”  (e.g., given a significant increase in 
activation in the amygdala, is the person more likely to be experiencing anger, perceiving 
fear, etc.?). I used a series of exploratory stepwise logistic regressions to ascertain which 
emotion categories and methodological variables best predicted increases in activation in 
particular brain regions. Effect-coded emotion and method variables were regressed on to 
binary activation vectors indicating whether a given contrast in the database (e.g., fear 
perception) activated within 10 mm of a given brain location. Clusters were selected from 
the neural reference space in an a priori fashion (using the height-threshold or a stringent 
extent-threshold, p<.001) based on the predictions of locationist and constructionist 
hypotheses. In each brain region, I examined whether significant increases in activation were 
best predicted by each emotion category by modality (e.g., anger experience, anger 
perception, etc.), more general valence (pleasantness v. unpleasantness) and arousal (high v. 
low arousal), as well as induction method (visual, auditory, imagery, recall, taste, olfaction), 
stimuli used (films, pictures, faces, music, voice, words, personal event, food, odor, sounds), 
level of cognitive demand (present or absent), focus of attention (foregrounding or 
backgrounding of emotional content), and object of evaluation (bodily feelings or external 
stimulus). All variables were analyzed as main effects. Activation vectors were extracted from 
regions of interest within the neural reference space for discrete emotion using a Matlab 
script written by Tor Wager (Meta_cluster_tools.m). All logistic regressions were performed 
in Stata 10 software using the Logistic Regression package developed by J. Scott Long (from 
www.indiana.edu/~jsloc/stata) 2 
                                                 
2 Step-wise regression has limitations because it only includes the variables that best predict activation in the 
resulting model. To address this issue, I also ran a set of hierarchical logistic regressions that specifically tested 
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Predictions 
The strongest support for a locationist account in the present meta-analysis would be 
evidence that a given emotion category was consistently and specifically associated with 
increased activation in a given brain area. This evidence would be observed in the absolute 
analyses and logistic regressions. In the absolute analysis, evidence for a locationist account 
would be observed if one emotion category, but no others, was associated with increased 
activation in a certain brain region at levels greater than would be expected by chance alone 
(e.g., when a person is experiencing fear, an increase in amygdala activity that is greater than 
would be expected by chance is observed. When a person is experiencing anger, sadness, 
etc., an increase in amygdala activity is not observed). In the logistic regressions, evidence for 
a locationist account would be observed if an increase in activity in a given brain area was 
predicted by one emotion category and all other emotion categories negatively predicted an 
increase in activity there (e.g., an increase in amygdala activity is predicted by the experience 
of fear but the experience of anger, sadness, etc. predict that the amygdala will be not be 
activated).  
The strongest support for a constructionist view in this meta-analysis would be 
evidence that emotion categories are consistently associated with activation in brain regions 
more generally related to core affect, core association, language, and executive attention. 
Emotion categories will not be specifically related to any one brain region, however. This 
pattern might be evidenced in the absolute analyses, relative analyses or the logistic 
regressions. In the absolute analysis, evidence for a psychological construction account 
would be observed if several emotion categories were associated with increased activation in 
                                                                                                                                                 
locationist hypotheses of brain-emotion correspondence. The findings of these hierarchical logistic regressions 
were similar to the step-wise logistic regressions reported here, so I do not include them.   
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a given brain region at levels greater than would be expected by chance (e.g., when a person 
is experiencing fear, anger or sadness, an increase in amygdala activity that is greater than 
would be expected by chance is observed). I might also find that brain activation is relatively 
more associated with one of these emotion categories than the others in the relative analyses 
(e.g., when a person is experiencing fear, there is a significantly greater increase in amygdala 
activity than when a person is experiencing anger or sadness). This relative difference would 
imply that those mental states differentially recruit a certain psychological ingredient (e.g., the 
experience of fear involves the processing of salient information relatively more so than the 
experience of anger or sadness). Finally, evidence for a psychological construction account 
would be observed in the logistic regressions if an increase in activation in a given brain area 
was best predicted by several different emotion categories, methods variables or more 
general psychological variables (cognitive load, arousal, visual stimuli) (e.g., an increase in 
amygdala activity is predicted by the experience of fear and the experience of anger or by 
high arousal stimuli and visual stimuli more generally). 
Results 
The Neural Reference Space for Discrete Emotion 
Even with the addition of new studies and different inclusion criteria (i.e., only 
discrete emotion contrasts with a neutral reference condition), the neural reference space for 
discrete emotion (presented in Figure 9) remained very similar to the one published in Wager 
et al. (2008) and Kober et al. (2008). Regions surviving the height-based and most stringent 
extent-based thresholds are presented in Table 7. Consistent with previous findings, the 
neural reference space included limbic and paralimbic areas involved in a core affect network 
(Barrett, Mesquita, et al. 2007; Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009), areas within the core 
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association network (e.g., Buckner et al. 2007; Schacter et al. 2007; Bar, 2009), lateral 
prefrontal areas involved in language and executive control and exteroceptive sensory 
processing areas. Consistent with a psychological construction approach, these brain regions 
are implicated in many other psychological phenomena, including the representation of 
interoceptive states, memory, categorization and prospection, semantic retrieval and 
language processing, working memory, executive control, and sensation and perception.  
Figures depicting the neural reference spaces for the experience and perception of anger, 
disgust, fear, happiness and sadness are presented in Appendix B. 
Testing Brain-Emotion Correspondence 
 Table 8 presents the brain regions that were consistently associated with a given 
discrete emotion category at levels that would be expected greater than chance (absolute 
analyses). Table 9 presents the brain regions that consistently showed greater activation for 
one discrete emotion category relative to all others (relative analyses). Table 10 presents the 
emotion experience and perception variables and method variables that were most likely to 
be associated with activation in a given brain area (logistic regressions). For each brain area, the 
overall model fit and significance are listed, as are the β, odds, and statistical significance of 
each variable’s ability to predict activation at the brain locale.  In the logistic regressions, the 
odds ratio is the likelihood that activation of a brain location is associated with a variable 
(e.g., that amygdala activity is associated with fear perception) divided by the probability that 
is not associated with a variable (e.g., that amygdala activity is not associated with fear 
perception). An odds ratio can also be represented as a percent increase (over the mean 
likelihood of any variable in the database activating there), which are referred to in Figures 
10-18 (this is calculated by subtracting 1 from the odds ratio and multiplying by 100).  
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The amygdala- fear hypothesis. The amygdala was consistently, but not specifically, 
associated with the perception of fear.  The perception of fear was associated with increased 
activation in bilateral amygdala (611 voxels) relatively more so than the perception of any 
other emotion (Table 9). Yet, the perception of fear was not associated with amygdala 
activation more than would be expected by chance alone, suggesting that increases in 
amygdala activation during the perception of fear are a matter of degree and not kind (i.e., 
the amygdala is not specific to fear). The experience of disgust, on the other hand, was 
consistently associated with increased activation in 111 voxels within the amygdala more so 
than would be expected by chance (Table 8).  The experience of disgust was also relatively 
more likely to be associated with increased activation in 247 voxels of bilateral amygdala than 
were the experience of “anger,” “fear,” “happiness” and “sadness.” 
The amygdala not only showed a consistent increase in activation during the 
perception of fear and the experience of disgust in the MDKA, but these categories also 
predicted amygdala activation in the logistic regressions. See Figure 10 and Table 10.  When 
a significant increase in L. amygdala activation was observed, participants were more likely to 
be experiencing disgust or perceiving fear than to be in any other mental state.  Furthermore, 
during this increase in amygdala response, participants were unlikely to be experiencing fear 
or perceiving anger. The fact that other emotion states (e.g., the perception of disgust) did 
not positively or negatively predict increased L. amygdala activity indicates that the L. 
amygdala showed an increase in activity during some instances of these categories, but not 
others (e.g., the L. amygdala showed increased activity during some instances of perceiving 
disgust but during other instances it did not).  When a significant increase in R. amygdala 
activation was observed, participants were most likely to be experiencing or perceiving any 
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emotion category that was high in arousal (e.g., the experience and perception of fear, anger 
and disgust). 
By any set of criterion, then, the amygdala cannot be considered the brain locus of 
fear. Instead, the findings appear to be more consistent with the psychological construction 
hypothesis that the amygdala is involved in the brain response to salient stimuli. Activation 
within the R. amygdala was best predicted by arousal, a property of the psychological 
ingredient of core affect (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Russell & Barrett, 1999).  Activation 
in the L. amygdala was not predicted by arousal more generally because the experience of 
fear and the perception of anger—two of the six types of contrasts containing high arousal 
emotional content in the database—consistently failed to be associated with increased 
activity in the L. amygdala.  Yet, the fact that L. amygdala activity was associated with the 
experience of disgust and the perception of fear is still consistent with the idea that the 
amygdala responds to high arousal affect. Over a third (34.8%; 15/43) of the study contrasts 
in the database assessing disgust experience presented participants with images that were 
highly arousing (i.e., containing contamination, mutilated body parts, maggots, etc.) and 
novel (i.e., infrequently experienced in the industrialized world). Similarly, over ninety 
percent (92.9%; 53/57) of the study contrasts assessing fear perception in the database used 
fearful faces, which are experienced as highly arousing (e.g., Russell & Bullock, 1986) and are 
relatively novel and unfamiliar to college students (Whalen et al. 2001) (who are typically the 
participants in neuroimaging studies of these sort). Consistent with the psychological 
constructionist argument that the amygdala is implicated in the brain response to salient 
exteroceptive sensory stimuli, the L. amygdala was also less likely to be active when emotion 
experience was induced via recall of a personal event and mental imagery (see Figure 10). 
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The insula-disgust hypothesis. The anterior insula was consistently, but not specifically, 
associated with the perception of disgust.  The experience of disgust was not associated with 
consistent activation of the anterior insula in either the absolute or relative analyses.  The 
perception of disgust was consistently associated with increased activation in four voxels in 
the right anterior insula more so than would be expected by chance (R. a. ins) (Table 8). The 
perception of disgust was also relatively more associated with activation in 252 voxels in the 
R. a. ins. than were other emotions (Table 9). The experience of anger, on the other hand, 
was consistently associated with increased activation in one voxel of the left anterior insula 
(L. a. ins) more so than would be expected by chance. This effect was also observed relative 
to the experience of other emotions in 2 voxels of L. a. ins (Tables 8 and 9).  
The L. a. ins not only showed a consistent increase in activation during the 
experience of anger in the MKDA, but this category also best predicted L. a. ins. activation 
in the logistic regressions (see Figure 11; Table 10). The cluster extracted from the height-
based threshold actually contained some voxels from the lOFC (see Table 10 note) making 
these findings consistent with the OFC-anger hypothesis. To examine whether the 
experience of anger predicted activity in the insula specifically, emotion and method 
variables were regressed on a 193-voxel cluster in L. mid-insula (extracted from the extent-
based neural reference space, p<.001). Consistent with the findings in L. a. ins, activation 
increases in this L. mid-insula cluster were also more likely to be associated with the 
experience of anger than any other variable (see Table 10). Finally, the variables predicting 
activation in R. a. ins were assessed. Consistent with a psychological construction account 
linking the insula to the representation of bodily states, increased activation in R. a. ins was 
most likely to occur in tasks where participants were asked to explicitly evaluate their feelings 
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(regardless of the emotion category experienced).  Taken together, these findings suggest 
that the relationship between disgust perception and activation in the insula is asymmetrical: 
when a person is perceiving disgust, it is likely that their R. a. ins will be active. But when R. 
a. ins. activity is observed, it is not necessarily the case that a person will be perceiving 
disgust.  
The present findings suggest that the a. ins is involved during the perception of 
disgust but not the experience of disgust, providing partial support for the insula-disgust 
hypothesis.  These findings do not rule out a psychological construction account of insula 
function, however; disgust perception might preferentially activate the insula because people 
are more likely to simulate visceral states (like those associated with the gut and food 
rejection) when perceiving facial behaviors characterized by a wrinkled nose and curled lip 
(i.e., oral revulsion; Angyal, 1941 see Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008; e.g., von dem Hagen 
et al. 2009). Indeed, I found evidence consistent with this psychological construction 
account: increased activity in R. a. ins. was best predicted by a focus on feelings across all 
studies of emotion.  
The meta-analytic findings also suggest that the insula might be important to the 
experience of anger, although they are not strong enough to form the basis of a new 
locationist hypothesis because only 1 voxel in the left a. ins was associated with the 
experience of anger more so than would be expected by chance. More likely, the experience 
of anger is associated with activation in a whole swath of cortex in the left frontal lobe (see 
findings below for the L. lOFC, VLPFC and DLPFC). This interpretation is consistent with 
electrophysiological findings that approach (vs. avoidance) motivation is relatively left-
lateralized (Fox, 1991; Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1997; Sutton & Davidson, 1997). It also fits 
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with characterizations of anger as an appetitive, approach-related emotion (Carver & 
Harmon-Jones, 2009) and findings that anger corresponds to electrical activity in left 
prefrontal cortex (e.g., Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 2001).  
The orbitofrontal cortex-anger hypothesis. The OFC was somewhat consistently, but not 
specifically, associated with the experience of anger. Neither the experience nor perception 
of anger consistently activated the OFC in the absolute or relative analyses. Instead, the 
experience of disgust was consistently associated with increased activity in 167 voxels in L. 
lOFC (BA 11) (both at levels significantly greater than would be expected by chance and to a 
significantly greater degree than any other emotion category; Tables 8 and 9).  The 
perception of disgust was consistently associated with increased activation in 8 voxels in R. 
lOFC (BA 47) more so than would be expected by chance. The spatial extent of this effect 
increased when the perception of disgust was compared to the perception of other emotions 
(to cover a 37-voxel cluster extending into R. a. ins.). 
The OFC not only showed a consistent increase in activation during the perception 
of disgust in the MDKA, but this category predicted OFC activation in the logistic 
regressions. When a significant increase in R. lOFC activation was observed, participants 
were most likely to be perceiving or experiencing disgust than to be in any other emotion 
state (see Figure 12 and Table 10 for findings in a separate cluster of R. lOFC). Consistent 
with prior findings linking the experience of anger broadly to left prefrontal cortex, increased 
activation in L. lOFC (BA 47) was more likely to occur during the experience of anger than 
any other emotion category. Finally, increased activation in clusters of L. and R. lOFC was 
predicted by auditory stimuli (i.e., sounds, voices), picture stimuli, and high arousal affect 
more generally, consistent with the psychological construction OFC-context-based behavior 
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hypothesis (in which the OFC integrates sensory information from the world and body to 
guide behavior).  
Anterior cingulate cortex-sadness hypothesis. The meta-analytic evidence is not consistent 
with the hypothesis that the ACC is the brain basis of sadness. No single emotion category 
was associated with consistent activation in vACC or dACC at levels greater than would be 
expected by chance. This means that increased activation in the ACC occurred in all emotion 
categories. Two emotion categories were associated with activation in dACC relatively more 
than other emotion categories, however. The perception of sadness was consistently 
associated with increased activation in a single voxel in dACC (BA 32) to a greater degree 
than was the perception of other emotions (Table 9). The perception of fear was consistently 
associated with increased activation in 186 voxels in dACC (BA 24) to a greater degree than 
the perception of other emotions (Table 9). Consistent with a constructionist ACC-conflict 
hypothesis, the logistic regressions revealed that increased activation in two clusters in the 
dACC (BA 32) was more likely to occur during tasks containing cognitive load than during 
any other emotion state or in response to any other method variable. See Figure 13 and 
Table 10. 
By any set of criterion, then, the ACC cannot be considered the brain locus of 
sadness. Instead, the findings appear to be more consistent with the psychological 
construction hypothesis that the ACC is involved in the brain response to conflicting 
sensory arrays. Although I found evidence that the perception of sadness was relatively more 
associated with a single voxel in the dACC than was the perception of other emotions, this is 
not sufficient support to conclude that the ACC is the brain basis of sadness. Instead, the 
findings are more consistent with the psychological construction hypothesis that the dACC 
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is involved in executive control processes during conflict monitoring and response. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, dACC was consistently associated with the perception of 
fearful faces, perhaps because they are unfamiliar, hard to understand (e.g., Whalen et al. 
2001), and thus require executive attention to reduce ambiguity.  
DMPFC, MTL and Retrosplenial cortex.  Regions of the core association network such 
as DMPFC, MTL and retrosplenial cortex (Buckner et al. 2008) were part of the neural 
reference space for discrete emotion. My findings are the first to indicate that the core 
association network is integral in the experience and perception of discrete emotions, and are 
consistent with the hypothesis that prior episodic experience helps shape experienced or 
perceived affect into meaningful instances of emotion (Barrett, 2006 b; 2009a, b).  
Areas in the core association network were associated with discrete emotion 
categories with differential consistency, in line with the constructionist view that the relative 
weighting of ingredients differs across mental states. The experience of sadness was 
associated with consistent activation in only 1 voxel in DMPFC (BA 9) (both significantly 
more than would be expected by chance and to a significantly greater degree than the 
experience of other emotions) (Tables 8 and 9). The experience of happiness was associated 
with consistent activation in a 324-voxel cluster in DMPFC (BA 9; abutting BA 32) and in a 
379-voxel cluster in retrosplenial cortex (BA 30) relatively more than were other emotion 
categories (Table 9). Additionally, the logistic regression findings revealed that increased 
activation in a cluster of DMPFC (extending into dACC) was more likely to occur during the 
perception of disgust than any other variable (see Figure 14 and Table 10). The cluster of 
DMPFC associated with disgust perception in the logistic regressions overlapped with the 
clusters associated with the experience of happiness and sadness in the MKDA, suggesting 
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that the DMPFC is broadly implicated in a number of emotion categories. Consistent with 
the role of core association in simulating episodic experience (see Buckner et al. 2007), 
increases in activation in a separate cluster in DMPFC (BA 9) were more likely to occur 
during emotion inductions using recall and films than during any other emotion state or 
experimental method (see Table 10). The fact that films were associated with activation in 
the same cluster as recall suggests that inductions using film recruit a form of deep 
simulation that is involved in recollecting one’s own experiences.  
Several emotion categories were associated with consistent activation in the MTL.  
The experience of sadness was consistently associated with increased activation in 10 voxels 
in L. dorsal entorhinal cortex (EC) to a degree greater than would be expected by chance. 
The experience of sadness was also consistently associated with increased activation in 
broader cluster of EC (19 voxels) when compared to the experience of other emotions 
(Tables 8 and 9). The perception of sadness was consistently associated with increased 
activation in one voxel in the L. hippocampus more so than the perception of other 
emotions. The experience of disgust was consistently associated with increased activation in 
a 1-voxel cluster in left dorsal EC (BA 34) (both significantly greater than would be expected 
by chance and to a significantly greater degree than other emotion categories). The 
perception of anger was associated with increased activation in 23 voxels within R. dorsal 
EC (BA 34) to a degree significantly greater than chance. Relative to other emotions, this 
cluster expanded to 27 voxels. Finally, the perception of fear was consistently associated with 
increased activation in one voxel in R. dorsal EC more so than any other emotion category. 
This finding was corroborated by the logistic regressions. See Figure 15 and Table 10. 
Increased activation in bilateral EC and the L. hippocampus was more likely to be associated 
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with the perception of fear than any other variable. This finding is consistent with the 
constructionist hypothesis that the amygdala facilitates increased sensory processing and 
encoding of uncertain information in memory. In line with the constructionist hypothesis 
that the core association network supports categorization during the perception of all 
affective facial behaviors, I also found that increased activity in the R. hippocampus was 
likely to occur any time a person perceived emotion in the face or voice of another person.  
Anterior temporal lobe and VLPFC. Areas in the distributed network for language like 
the ATL and VLPFC were part of the neural reference space for discrete emotion. The fact 
that the ATL and VLPFC were consistently activated across studies of emotion is consistent 
with the psychological construction hypothesis that language-based categories support the 
experience and perception of emotion (Barrett, 2006b, 2009a; Barrett, Lindquist et al. 2007). 
No single emotion category activated the ATL (either significantly more than expected by 
chance or significantly more than other emotion categories), suggesting that the ATL is 
ubiquitously active across all emotion categories. The perception of disgust was the only 
category to be associated with a consistent increase in activation in R. VLPFC (BA 44; 66 
voxels) that was significantly greater than what would be expected by chance (Table 8). 
When compared to the perception of other emotions, this cluster expanded to 71 voxels 
(Table 9).  
Consistent with the MKDA findings, increased activation in L. and R. VLPFC (BA 
44) was more likely to be associated with the perception of disgust than any other emotion 
state or method variable in the logistic regressions. Increased activation in the L. ATL and L. 
VLPFC (BA 44) was more likely to occur during the experience of anger than any other 
emotion category, in accordance with the prior findings that the experience of anger recruits 
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left prefrontal cortex (see The Insula-Disgust Hypothesis and The Anger-OFC Hypothesis). See 
Figure 16 and Table 10. 
Finally, the logistic regressions revealed that increased activation in L. VLPFC (BA 
44) was likely to occur in tasks in which participants explicitly attended to emotional 
information (Figure 16). That the VLPFC would be active when people were aware of 
affective feelings or perceptions is consistent with the psychological construction hypothesis 
that language is brought to bear during the experience of emotion by making core affect 
meaningful (e.g., Lindquist & Barrett, 2008), and during the perception of emotion by 
making affective facial actions meaningful (e.g., Barrett & Kensinger, in press). Increased 
activation in L. VLPFC (BA 44) was also likely to occur when participants perceived face 
stimuli, providing additional support for the idea that language is brought to bear when 
perceiving emotion in faces (See Table 10 for other variables associated with increased 
activation in the L. VLPFC). Increased activation in the R. ATL occurred during tasks in 
which participants were asked to evaluate a stimulus, also suggesting this region’s role in 
language and categorization more generally (Figure 17 and Table 10).  
VLPFC and DLPFC. Areas in the distributed network for executive control such as 
VLPFC and DLPFC helped constitute the neural reference space for discrete emotion, 
consistent with the psychological construction hypothesis that executive control modulates 
how psychological ingredients influence one another in the emergence of emotion (Barrett, 
2009a, b; Barrett, Tugade & Engel, 2004). The perception of anger was consistently 
associated with increased activation in 27 voxels within L. DLFPC (BA 9) and 137 voxels 
within R. DLPFC (BA 9) (both at levels significantly greater than would be expected by 
chance and to a significantly greater degree than in the perception of other emotions) 
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(Tables 8 and 9). This finding was replicated in the logistic regressions, where increased 
activation in L. BA 9 was more likely to occur during the perception of anger than during 
any other emotion state or method variable. The perception of anger was also more likely to 
be associated with increased activation in L. BA 46 than any other variable (see Table 10).  
  Consistent with the DLPFC’s known role in executive function, the logistic 
regressions revealed that increased activation in R. DLPFC (BA 9) was most likely to occur 
in contrasts where participants were asked to explicitly evaluate stimuli (Figure 18 and Table 
10). Increases in L. BA 9 and L. BA 46 were also particularly likely to occur in tasks where 
participants were asked to pay attention to emotional information (Figure 18 and Table 10).  
Periacquiductal Grey (PAG). I did not have strong a priori hypotheses about the PAG’s 
role in discrete emotion states. The PAG surrounds the cerebral aqueduct and is the location 
of ascending fibers of the spinothalamic and spinomesencephalamic tract. It is implicated in 
visceromotor control during goal-directed behaviors (see Kober et al. 2008 for a discussion) 
and so is generally implicated in instantiating core affective states. Consistent with the idea 
that the PAG is generally involved in instantiating core affect and hence involved across all 
emotional states, the PAG did not correspond to any single emotion category more than 
another (although the experience of sadness was associated with consistent activation in 1 
voxel within ventral PAG see Tables 8 and 9). The logistic regressions demonstrated that 
increased activation in the PAG was particularly likely to occur during the experience or 
perception of any high arousal emotional state (see Table 10). Consistent with this finding, 
increased activation in a different cluster in the PAG was likely to occur during the 
experience of fear (see Table 10). All high arousal emotion categories in the database were 
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also unpleasant (e.g., fear, anger, disgust) so these findings are consistent with prior meta-
analytic findings linking the PAG to unpleasant affect (Wager et al. 2008). 
Visual Cortex. I did not predict a priori that brain regions involved in processing 
exteroceptive sensory information would help comprise the neural reference space for 
discrete emotion. Yet regions of visual cortex were some of the most frequent to appear in 
the MKDA findings (replicating several recent meta-analyses; e.g., Fusar-Poli et al. 2008; 
Kober et al. 2008; Vytal & Hamann, in press). Consistent activation of visual cortex was 
associated with unpleasant, highly arousing emotions, consistent with growing functional 
evidence that affect modulates vision (e.g., Damaraju, Huang, Barrett & Pessoa, 2009; 
Mickley Steinmetz & Kensinger, 2009; Padmala & Pessoa, 2008; Phelps et al. 2006) and 
anatomical tracer studies demonstrating connectivity between the amygdala, OFC, and 
various aspects of visual cortex (e.g., Barbas, 1995; Carmichael & Price, 1995b; Freese & 
Amaral, 2006; for reviews see Duncan & Barrett, 2007; Barrett & Bar, 2009). It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to discuss these findings in detail here, but in brief, I found that the 
experience of fear, the perception of anger, and the experience of disgust were consistently 
associated with activity in regions of visual cortex ranging from V2 to visual association 
cortex (BAs 37, 21) (see Tables 8 and 9). Such activation was not solely predicted by the 
stimuli used in the experimental studies, however, because emotion categories significantly 
predicted activation in visual cortex in the logistic regressions as well. See Table 10 for 
variables that activated the visual cortex and Lindquist, Wager, Bliss-Moreau, Kober & 
Barrett (in prep) for a discussion.  
Conclusion 
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Over a century ago, William James argued that “sensational, associational, and motor 
elements are all that [the brain] need contain” to produce the variety of mental states that 
constitute the human mind (cf., p. 473, James, 1890/1998). James believed that emotions, 
thoughts, and memories were commonsense categories whose instances do not require 
special brain centers. James’ view foreshadowed modern psychological constructionist views 
of the mind and the findings of this meta-analytic review, which are largely consistent with a 
constructionist approach. This meta-analytic review suggests that emotion categories are not 
natural kind categories respected by the architecture of the brain.  
In keeping with James’ predictions, this meta-analytic review did not find strong 
evidence for any locationist hypothesis of brain-emotion correspondence. In all instances 
where a brain region was consistently active during a discrete emotion category (e.g., the 
amygdala in fear perception), it was not specifically so, failing to support a key locationist 
assumption. Instead, brain regions were active across many emotion categories. Often, these 
regions were consistent with the psychological ingredients that we have written about and 
hypothesized in other papers (e.g., Barrett, 2009a; Barrett & Lindquist, under review). For 
instance, across emotion categories there was consistent activation in key nodes in networks 
involved in uncertainty detection, representation of bodily states, conflict monitoring and 
response, and using sensory information to make context-based decisions.  These 
mechanisms together help to realize core affect. There was also consistent activation in the 
brain regions implicated in core association (simulation of prior episodic experiences), 
language (representation and retrieval of semantic concepts), and executive control 
(volitional attention and working memory) across emotion categories. The absolute 
association between emotion categories and activity in certain brain regions was minimal—in 
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most cases, activity in only 1-20 voxels associated with an emotion category more than 
would be expected by chance.  Of course, there were sometimes relative differences in the 
degree to which brain regions were involved in realizing different categories of subjective 
experience or perception. These relative differences perhaps point to differences in the 
contents of these mental states (e.g., anger involves approach motivation; disgust perception 
involves the experience of bodily activation; fear perception involves detection of salient 
stimuli).  
Kober et al. (2008) hinted at the existence of psychological ingredients in the 
construction of emotion, but the current paper is the first to show that ingredients like core 
association, language, and executive control are consistently activated in neuroimaging 
studies despite a range of methodological variables, not because of them. This important 
finding lends further support to our psychological constructionist view. For instance, 
consistent activation in the amygdala was predicted by high arousal affect. Consistent insula 
activation was predicted by a focus on feelings. Consistent OFC activation was predicted by 
exteroceptive auditory and visual information. Consistent dACC activation was predicted by 
cognitive load.  
I also found that activation in visual cortex was predicted by the experience and 
perception of unpleasant, highly arousing emotions. This finding, along with the fact that 
visual cortex was one of the most frequently activated brain regions in the MKDA, might be 
grounds for adding another basic psychological ingredient (e.g., “exteroceptive sensory 
perception”) to a psychological constructionist theoretical framework. Regions in left lateral 
prefrontal cortex were also consistently observed in anger experience, suggesting that a 
network for approach-related motivation might constitute another aspect of core affect. 
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Although it is possible that the left frontal lobe (including the anterior and mid-insula, 
VLPFC, DLPFC and OFC), is generally the brain seat of anger, it is unlikely that this 
heterogeneous group of brain regions would be the origin of a single psychological category.  
Alternate Interpretations 
 
Of course, there are alternate explanations for why this meta-analysis did not reveal 
strong evidence in support of a locationist framework. It is possible the level of 
psychological analysis used was too gross. The common sense categories of emotion that we 
colloquially use in English (“fear,” “anger,” “sadness,” etc.) might be too heterogeneous to 
support scientific induction, and more subordinate level categories might better correspond 
to consistent and specific locations in the brain. For instance, it is possible that states of 
“anxiety” and “nervousness” have a clear correspondence in discrete brain regions but 
scientists have thus far been unable to discern this because these states are classified together 
under the superordinate category of “fear.” While this is always a possibility (and is 
empirically testable, although not with the present database), the present findings suggest 
that it is unlikely that any complex emotion categories correspond well to specific locales of 
brain anatomy. If the English terms “fear,” “anger” and “sadness” don’t correspond to 
discrete brain circuitry, then it seems unlikely that English terms like “anxiety,” “rage,” and 
“despair” would.  Put another way by neuroscientist Eliot Valenstein following his electrical 
stimulation studies of the human brain: “It would be very surprising indeed if the brain were 
organized into spatially discrete units that conform to our abstract categorizations of 
behavior’’ (Valenstein, 1973, p. 142-143). 
It is also possible that I did not find strong support for locationist accounts because 
my level of neuroscientific analysis was too broad. Neuroimaging is only capable of 
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measuring gross blood flow to a given brain area during a psychological state. It thus remains 
possible that scientists might find functional specialization for emotion at a more basic level 
of analysis (e.g., at the level of cortical columns of neurons). Yet it is also possible that 
localizations for complex psychological categories would be even less likely at this more 
basic level of analysis.  The same neurons very often participate in different neural 
assemblies producing different functions (referred to as neural degeneracy by Edelman, 1989; 
for a discussion of the mechanism by which this might occur, see Izhikevich et al. 2003). 
This makes strong locationist interpretations of brain function, even at the level of the 
cortical column, unlikely. If localization at the level of cortical columns exists, is likely to 
serve more basic mechanisms that help constitute numerous psychological processes (for a 
discussion, see Barrett, 2009b). This idea, too, is consistent with the psychological 
construction ontology of brain-emotion correspondence.  
A final explanation for the present findings is that I failed to locate the discrete brain 
basis for emotions because what actually exist are discrete circuits for behaviors that 
correspond to specific discrete emotion categories. There is certainly well-documented 
evidence for the neural circuitry underlying specific actions like vocalizations (see Jürgens, 
2009), maternal behavior (see Numan, 2007), freezing (see Fanselow & Poulos, 2005), startle 
(see Davis et al. 2008; Lang et al. 2000), and reward (see Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008; 
Shultz, 2006) (just to name a few). Yet, animals produce behaviors in a context-driven 
fashion, so many different behaviors can be associated with a given discrete emotion 
category. For instance, rats freeze in the face of a threat, but they also aggress, run away, or 
sometimes do nothing. Even if certain action patterns are more likely to occur in certain 
emotion categories, it would be philosophically and scientifically problematic to reduce the 
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range of human emotion to a set of fixed action patterns because a large number of human 
mental states would go unexplained (cf. Barrett, Lindquist et al. 2007).  For instance, freezing 
might be more likely to occur in “fear” than in “sadness,” or “happiness,” but this does not 
mean that the neural circuitry for freezing is the neural circuitry for “fear.” If researchers 
defined “fear” as only the tendency to freeze in the face of a predator, then times when a rat 
flees, attacks, kicks bedding at the predator or avoids an unknown corner of a maze would 
not be considered “fear.” And times when humans avoid a dark alley, bungee jump, 
remember the events of September 11th, lock the door at night, or password protect their 
online bank accounts could not be considered part of the category “fear.”Although these 
three alternate conventions for mapping the mind to brain are theoretically possible, they do 
not seem plausible based on the current literature.  
Mapping Emotion to Brain 
As neuroscientific methodologies progress, it will become increasingly imperative 
that scientists formulate a viable framework for mapping emotions to the brain. The present 
findings strongly suggest that a psychological construction view can satisfactorily describe 
the brain basis of emotion. Locationist views might be deeply entrenched in both our 
scientific and commonsense explanations of emotion, but they do not match the scientific 
evidence.  In this regard, the neuroimaging findings are consistent with other objective 
measures used in the study of emotion which fail to consistently distinguish between discrete 
emotional states (for a review, see Barrett, 2006a; Barrett Lindquist et al., 2007). 
Nonetheless, locationist approaches to emotion have dominated research and theorizing 
about emotion in psychology over the last century for several reasons.   
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First, the idea that emotions are coded in discrete ways in our brain fit with our most 
deeply held beliefs about emotions. People experience emotions as discrete and bounded 
events. That we experience emotions as states that wash over us, occupying our consciousness, 
and commanding our bodies, is not in doubt. Nor is it debated that people automatically and 
effortlessly perceive emotions on the faces and bodies others, in animals, or in inanimate 
objects. But rarely does the experience of a phenomenon shed light on how it is caused.  
Few scientists in this post-Cartesian era would deny that emotions are “created” in the brain 
or that emotions correspond to observable brain activity. Yet, this does not mean that we 
have neural apparatus for triggering “anger” when we’re offended or for detecting “fear” 
when someone moves their face a certain way.  Of course, the fact that people take the 
contents of their experiences as evidence of the processes that produce them is not unique 
to emotion. Consider, for example, the science of taste. Because human beings can readily 
distinguish between sweetness, sourness, saltiness, and bitterness, researchers have long 
assumed that there are four basic tastes, with a fifth discovered later (see Lindemann et al. 
2002)3. Over a century of research has followed suit, searching for the anatomical, 
neurochemical and neural correlates of these tastes (see Erickson, 2008). As it turns out, the 
evidence for these four basic tastes might not be as strong as scientists once thought (see 
Erickson, 2008).  
The second reason that locationist views of emotion have dominated over 
psychological construction approaches is historical. As a scientific discipline, psychology 
began as an amalgam of philosophy, physiology and neurology. In particular (and perhaps 
not surprisingly), the methods of scientific induction used in early neurology have most 
                                                 
3 Umami, a taste corresponding to foods rich in glutamate (e.g., fermented and aged foods), has recently been 
proposed as the fifth basic taste. 
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impacted modern-day neuroscience. This has not been without consequence for the science 
of emotion, however. Early neurological investigation of brain-mind correspondence derived 
hypotheses from double dissociations observed between mental states (e.g., emotions) and 
brain anatomy (e.g., the amygdala) following lesions. The result was locationist hypotheses of 
brain function: because a given brain region was damaged, a certain psychological function 
was impaired. I am not trying to argue that this research has not been essential to progress in 
neuroscience. Quite to the contrary—research in neurology during the 19th and 20th centuries 
literally formed the foundations of modern neuroscience (e.g., in the study of affect; e.g., 
Adolphs et al. 1994; Bechara et al. 1996; Harlow, 1848/1999; and memory; Corkin, 1965; 
1984; Schacter et al. 1982) and has been invaluable in scientists’ quest to understand how the 
brain creates the mind. Studies assessing patients with lesions (e.g., Clark et al. 2008; Khalsa 
et al. 2009; Koenigs et al. 2007) and neurodegenerative diseases (such as Alzheimers disease; 
e.g., deIopolyi et al. 2007; frontotemporal dementia; e.g., Chow et al. 2009; Rosen et al. 2004; 
and semantic dementia; e.g., Gorno-Tempini et al. 2004 to name a few) are still making great 
contributions to scientists’ knowledge of brain function. The point is that the locationist 
logic used in lesion studies is not without consequence for how researchers theorize and 
even construct studies assessing brain-emotion correspondence.  
Finally, researchers might assume that emotions are reified in the brain because of 
the tenets of classical measurement theory (for a discussion, see Barrett, 2006a). In classical 
measurement theory, a set of correlated, measurable outcomes are assumed to derive 
existence from an abstract, latent category that is not directly measurable (Bollen & Lennox, 
1991). Using this logic, emotions are treated as latent variables that are supposed to give 
evidence of their existence in hypothesized correlations between facial expressions, feelings, 
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behaviors, and physiological patterns (Barrett, 2006a). In neuroscience, this translates into 
the assumption that there is a neural center from which these diagnostic emotion patterns 
issue. The idea that an emotion stems from a neural essence is also known in philosophy as 
the tendency to define emotions as a natural kinds by homology (see Barrett, 2006a). The 
idea that emotions produce correlated outcomes is known in philosophy as the tendency to 
define emotions as natural kinds by analogy (see Barrett, 2006a) and as it turns out, there is 
not good evidence for this assumption either. Emotion-specific patterns in emotion 
perception (for a review, Russell, 1994; Russell et al. 2003), psychophysiology (Cacioppo et 
al., 2000), electrical stimulation of the mammalian brain (Valenstein, 1973), or other 
measurement modalities used in the science of emotion are elusive (for a review, see Barrett, 
2006a; Barrett, Lindquist et al., 2007; Mauss & Robinson, 2009).  
Despite the field’s emphasis on locationist views (that inspired most of the 
experiments used in this meta-analysis), the bulk of the empirical evidence is more consistent 
with the hypothesis that emotions consist of basic ingredients that map to broad-scale 
networks in the brain. As a consequence, to fully explore the power of a psychological 
construction approach in future research, researchers might combine traditional 
neuroimaging techniques with methods that make network-based assumptions (e.g., 
Multivoxel Pattern Analysis; Haxby et al. 2001; Multivariate Partial Least Squares Analysis; 
McIntosh et al. 1996) about brain function (see Schienle & Schafer, 2009 for additional 
analysis approaches).   
Furthermore, the present findings suggest that researchers need to carefully consider 
the behavioral tasks that they ask participants to perform in neuroimaging studies. The 
findings that were most consistent with locationist accounts in the present meta-analysis 
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were found in studies of perception, not experience. In the study of emotion, there has been 
a tendency to make inferences about the universal production of emotion based on the ease 
and (somewhat bounded) universality in perceiving emotion (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1971). 
Indeed, many neuroimaging studies rely on the perception of faces to yield evidence for the 
brain basis of a category more generally (e.g., studying the brain basis of perceiving “fearful” 
faces will yield the more general brain basis of “fear”). Yet the present findings, along with 
prior meta-analytic findings from our project (Wager et al. 2008) suggest that the experience 
and perception of emotions recruit different aspects of the neural reference space for 
emotion in differing degrees. It is important not to assume that identifying the circuitry for 
perceiving an emotion necessarily implies anything about the circuitry for producing emotion 
when either designing studies or interpreting findings. 
Unifying the Mind 
 If a psychological construction approach to the mind is right, then some of 
psychology’s time honored distinctions become phenomenological ones, potentially 
impacting the scientific understanding of psychological phenomena ranging from decision-
making, attention, visual perception, mental illness, and perhaps even consciousness more 
generally. If phenomenological categories like “anger,” “sadness,” and “fear” are not 
respected by the brain, then it is possible that phenomenological categories like “cognition” 
and “emotion” are not respected by the brain either (for a discussion, see Barrett, 2009b; 
Duncan & Barrett, 2007; see Pessoa 2008 for a similar view).  According to a psychological 
construction view of the mind, “emotion” does not influence “cognition” during decision 
making as one pool ball exerts influence on another. Instead it suggests that core affect, core 
association, language, and executive control processes (and perhaps others) unite to form a 
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behavioral outcome. If this is the case, then scientists might not assume that “emotion” and 
“cognition” battle it out in the brain when a person makes the moral decision to sacrifice 
one life to save many (e.g., Greene et al. 2004), or that consumer decisions are predicated on 
competing affective and rational representations (e.g., Knutson et al. 2007). Instead, 
researchers might assume that affect and executive control are merely different sources of 
attention in the brain rather than processes that differ in kind (see Barrett, 2009b; 
Vuilleumier & Driver, 2007). Feeling and seeing might not be as distinct as typically assumed 
(Barrett & Bar, 2009; Duncan & Barrett, 2007). Even conceptions about “internal” v. 
“external” processing begin to break down when we take into account the fact that 
“internal” ingredients like affect and core association shape the very way in which 
exteroceptive sensory input is realized as sensations by the brain (Bar, 2009; Barrett & Bar, 
2009). A psychological construction framework of the mind thus begins to break down the 
most steadfast assumptions of our commonsense categories.  In so doing, it charts a 
different but exciting path forward for the science of the mind.  
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Tables 
             
   
Table 1. Locationist Hypotheses of Brain-Emotion Correspondence 
Brain Region Emotion 
Amygdala Fear 
Insula Disgust 
OFC Anger 
ACC Sadness 
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Table 2. Constructionist Hypotheses of Brain-Function Correspondence 
Brain Region Ingredient and role 
Amygdala Core affect; Signaling uncertainty 
Insula Core affect; Interoception 
OFC Core affect; Sensory integration for context-based behavior 
ACC Core affect; Conflict resolution 
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Table 3. Psychological Ingredients and their Functional Neural Networks 
Ingredient Network
Core Affect medial OFC (BAs 10m, 11m, 13a, m, b, 14r, c), lat. OFC (BAs ,47/12), ACC 
(BAs, 32, 24, 25) insula, amygdala, basal ganglia 
  
Core Association DMPFC (BAs 9, 10p), medial temporal lobe (hippocampus, entorhinal 
cortex, parahippocampal cortex), posterior cingulate cortex/retrosplenial 
area (BA 23, 31) 
  
Language VLPFC (BAs 44, 45, 46), anterior temporal lobe (BA 38)  
  
Executive Control DLPFC (BAs 9, 10, 46), VLPFC (BAs 44, 45, 46)
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Table 4. Prior Meta-analytic Findings for Locationist Hypotheses of Brain-Emotion Correspondence 
  Meta-analysis
Region Emotion Phan et al. (55) Murphy et al. (28) Vytal & Hamann (81) Fusar-Pioli et al.* (105)
Amygdala Anger     
 Disgust    
 Fear 
 
 Happiness    
 Sadness    
Insula Anger    
 Disgust   
 Fear     
 Happiness    
 Sadness     
      
OFC Anger    
 Disgust     
 Fear     
 Sadness     
      
vACC Anger     
 Sadness    
 Happiness     
dACC Anger     
 Disgust     
 Fear     
 Happiness   
 Sadness    
Note: The sample size of studies analyzed is noted in parentheses next to each meta-analysis. Brain regions hypothesized a priori are listed in bold. 
*Denotes that this meta-analysis assessed perception of emotional faces but not experience or perception more generally. 
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Table 5. Prior Meta-analytic Findings for Constructionist Hypotheses of Brain-Emotion Correspondence
  Meta-analysis
Region Ingredient Murphy et al.
(36) 
Wager et al. (65) 
Amygdala Affect (Withdraw)   
Insula Affect (Negative)   
 Affect (Avoid)   
Lat. OFC    
 Affect (Positive)   
 Affect (Approach)   
dACC Affect (Avoid)   
Striatum Affect (Avoid)   
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Table 6. Studies in Meta-analysis  
First Author Year N Fixed v. Random Modality Emotion(s) 
Aalto  2002 11 Random Experience Sadness 
Ashwin  2007 13 Random Perception Fear 
Beauregard  1998 7 Fixed Experience Sadness 
Blair  1999 13 Fixed Perception Anger 
Breiter  1996 10 Fixed Perception Fear, Happiness
Britton  2006a 12 Random Experience Sadness, Disgust
Britton  2006b 12 Random Experience, Perception Anger, Fear, Happiness, Sadness
Buchanan  2000 10 Random Perception Happiness, Sadness
Calder  2007 12 Random Experience Disgust 
Cooney  2007 14 Fixed Experience Sadness 
Damasio  2000 25* Fixed Experience Anger, Fear, Happiness, Sadness
Dannlowski  2007 23 Random Perception Anger, Sadness
Das  2005 28 Random Perception Fear 
Deeley  2006 9 Fixed Perception Fear 
Dolan  1996 8 Fixed Perception Happiness 
Dougherty  1999 8  Fixed Experience Anger 
Eugene  2003 20 Random Experience Sadness 
Fischer  2004 24 Random Perception Anger 
Fitzgerald  2004 12 Random Experience Disgust 
Fitzgerald  2006 20 Random Perception Anger, Disgust, Fear, Happiness, Sadness
George  1994 21 Fixed Experience Sadness 
George  1995 11 Fixed Experience Sadness 
George  1996b 10 Fixed Experience Happiness, Sadness
Grandjean  2005 15 Random Perception Anger 
Grezes  2007 16 Random Perception Fear 
Grosbras  2006 20 Random Perception Anger 
Hutcherson  2005 28 Random Experience Sadness 
KeslerWest  2001 21 Fixed Perception Anger, Fear, Happiness, Sadness
Killgore  2004 12 Random Perception Happiness, Sadness
Kilts  2003 13 Random Perception Anger, Happiness
Kimbrell  1999 16 Fixed Experience Anger 
Lane  1997c 11 Fixed Experience Disgust, Happiness, Sadness 
Lange  2003 9 Random Perception Fear 
Lee  2006 18 Random Perception Anger, Happiness, Sadness
Levesque  2003 20 Random Experience Sadness 
Liddell  2005 25 Random Perception Fear 
Liotti  2000 8 Fixed Experience Sadness 
Malhi  2007 10 Random Perception Disgust, Fear 
Marci  2007 10 Fixed Experience Anger, Happiness, Sadness
Markowitch  2003 13 Random Experience Happiness, Sadness
Mayberg  1999 8 Fixed Experience Sadness 
Minzenberg  2007 12 Fixed Perception Anger, Fear 
Mitchell  2007 15 Random Perception Fear 
Mitterschiffthaler  2007 16 Random Experience Happiness, Sadness
Mizuno  2007 18 Random Perception Happiness, Sadness
Moll  2005 13 Fixed Experience Anger, Disgust
Nomura  2004 9 Fixed Perception Anger 
Ottowitz  2004 8 Fixed Experience Sadness 
Paradiso  1997 8 Fixed Experience Disgust, Happiness
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Pardo  1993 7 Fixed Experience Sadness 
Partiot  1995 12 Fixed Experience Sadness 
Peelen  2007 18 Random Perception Anger, Disgust, Fear, Happiness, Sadness
Pessoa  2002 21 Fixed Perception Disgust, Fear 
Phillips  1997 7 Random Perception Disgust, Fear 
Phillips  1998a 6 Random Perception Disgust, Fear 
Phillips  1998b 8 Random Perception Happiness, Sadness
Phillips  2004 8 Random Perception Disgust, Fear 
Pietrini  2000 15 Random Experience Anger 
Pourtois  2005 8  Random Perception Fear, Happiness
Rauch  2007 20 Random Perception Anger, Fear, Happiness
Reinders  2005 15 Random Perception Fear 
Salloum  2007 11 Random Perception Anger, Disgust, Fear, Happiness, Sadness
Sambataro  2006 24 Random Perception Disgust 
Sato  2004 10 Random Perception Anger 
Schacher  2006 17 Random Perception Fear 
Schafer  2005 40 Fixed Experience Disgust, Fear 
Schienle  2002 12 Random Experience Disgust, Fear 
Schienle  2006 12 Random Experience Disgust, Fear 
Schroeder  2004 20 Random Perception Disgust 
Silvert  2007 10 Random Perception Fear 
Simon  2006 17 Random Perception Anger 
Somerville  2004 16 Random Perception Happiness 
Sprengelmeyer  1998 6 Fixed Perception Anger, Disgust, Fear
Stark  2003 19 Random Experience Disgust, Fear 
Stark  2005 15  Random Experience Disgust, Fear 
Stark  2007 66 Random Experience Disgust, Fear 
Vuilleumier  2001 12 Random Perception Fear 
Wang  2005 12 Random Perception Sadness 
Whalen  2001 8 Fixed Perception Anger, Fear 
Wicker  2003 14 Random Experience, Perception Disgust 
Williams, L. 2001 11 Fixed Perception Fear 
Williams, L. 2004 22 Fixed Perception Fear 
Williams, C. 2005 13 Random Perception Anger, Disgust, Fear
Williams, L. 2006a 15 Random Perception Fear 
Williams, L. 2006b 13 Random Perception Fear 
Williams, L.  2006c 15 Random Perception Fear 
Wright, C  2006 18 Random Perception Fear 
Wright, P  2004 8 Fixed Experience Disgust, Fear 
Yamasaki  2002 10 Fixed Experience Disgust 
Note: Damasio et al. 2000 had differing Ns across contrasts (ranging from 16-25) 
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Table 7. Neural Reference Space for Discrete Emotion 
Region BA Threshold Coordinates (MNI) Volume (voxels) 
   x y z  
Core affect       
L. amygdala  Height -20 -4 -16 1259 
R. amygdala  Height 22 -4 -16 919 
L. lat. OFC 47 Height -34 18 -16 1 
   -40 26 -6 173 
   -52 28 -6 1 
L. lat OFC/a. ins  Extent -42 28 -8 191 
   -32 24 -10 183 
   -46 24 0 337 
L .anterior insula  Height  -40 14 14 2 
  Extent -38 8 -10 123 
L. mid insula  Extent -38 8 -8 193 
R. lat. OFC 47 Height 44 26 0 6 
   44 26 -6 1 
   48 28 0 2 
   48 16 4 1 
  Extent 42 24 -4 286 
R. anterior insula  Extent 48 12 0 28 
  Extent 42 24 -4 286 
ACC 32 Extent 3 20 -2 31 
   0 38 6 62 
L. Putamen  Extent -22 8 -10 123 
   -28 -2 -4 68 
R. Putamen  Extent 28 6 0 243 
Midbrain (PAG)  Height -14 -28 -2 4 
  Extent -2 -30 -6 109 
Midbrain  Height 0 -4 4 1 
   10 -20 -8 1 
  Extent -4 0 2 337 
   -6 -8 0 258 
   16 -18 -8 206 
   8 -14 -2 176 
   6 -4 -2 150 
Core Association       
DMPFC 9 Height -8 46 34 2 
 8  -2 18 50 12 
   -4 16 56 1 
 9 Extent -6 40 32 21 
   -6 48 34 171 
   2 42 44 38 
DMPFC/d. ACC 9/32 Extent 2 46 14 52 
   -6 44 24 140 
DMPFC 8 Extent -4 18 48 112 
   -8 24 54 75 
   -8 16 56 138 
   0 12 56 39 
L. Parahippcampal cortex  Extent -18 -12 -26 79 
   -10 -34 -2 25 
R. Parahippcampal cortex   16 -10 -26 85 
L. Entorhinal cortex  Extent -12 4 -18 72 
   -24 -14 -8 65 
R. Entorhinal cortex  Extent 12 24 -14 80 
   24 6 -14 97 
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L. Hippocampus  Extent -32 -8 -20 91 
R. Hippocampus  Extent 30 -12 -16 70 
L. Temporal-parietal junction 39 Height -48 -76 8 1 
   -52 -60 10 1 
   -48 -68 8 77 
R. Temporal-parietal junction  Extent 54 -60 0 50 
   44 -58 2 164 
   54 -46 2 134 
Language       
R. Anterior temporal lobe 38 Height 36 6 -26 6 
   48 8 -16 1 
  Extent 40 14 -22 78 
L. Anterior temporal lobe  Extent -34 14 -20 260 
R. Superior temporal cortex 22 Height 54 -46 4 18 
   54 -34 6 1 
L. VLPFC 44 Extent -42 16 12 114 
R. VLPFC 45 Height 48 22 14 160 
   44 22 16 1 
 45 Extent 46 28 10 241 
   48 20 20 301 
   42 16 6 227 
Executive control       
R. DLPFC 9 Height 46 10 30 6 
  Extent 46 8 32 153 
   52 22 30 105 
L. VLPFC 9 Height -46 16 24 202 
L. DLPFC  Extent -52 18 26 65 
   -46 8 24 61 
L. DLPFC 46 Extent -40 18 26 110 
Extraceptive Sensory Input       
L. peristriate cortex 19 Height -46 -74 -6 1 
   -48 -68 8 77 
   -48 -76 8 1 
  Extent -40 -80 -14 176 
   -48 -72 -6 139 
R. peristriate cortex  Extent 50 -74 4 186 
L. occipitotemporal cortex 37 Height -48 -72 -2 1 
   -48 -68 0 1 
   -42 -58 18 462 
  Extent -46 -52 -24 89 
   -34 -62 -22 61 
   -38 -44 -20 118 
   -38 -72 -14 170 
   -42 -58 -10 83 
R. occipitotemporal cortex 37 Height 42 -54 20 437 
   40 -66 -12 1 
   40 -62 -8 1 
   48 -66 4 249 
  Extent 42 -54 -20 437 
   40 -66 -12 1 
   40 -62 -8 1 
   48 -66 4 249 
R. middle temporal cortex 21 Height 52 4 -14 1 
R. middle temporal cortex 21 Extent 50 2 -18 81 
   50 10 -18 136 
   54 4 -12 51 
Optic tract  Extent 0 -20 4 122 
Uncus  Extent -28 4 -28 157 
   36 0 -26 157 
   24 6 -26 85 
L. thalamus  Height -8 -24 6 1 
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   -10 -20 6 1 
   -12 -26 4 7 
  Extent -20 -28 2 61 
   -12 -28 2 152 
   -10 18 8 149 
R. thalamus  Height 8 -16 0 5 
  Extent 12 -20 2 80 
Additional regions       
L. cerebellum  Extent -44 -68 -24 112 
R. cerebellum   36 -58 -26 66 
R. SMA 6 Extent 46 0 40 67 
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Table 8.  Brain Regions Significantly More Active for a Category in the Absolute  Analyses 
Region BA Contrast Coordinates (MNI) Volume (voxels) 
   x y z   
Amygdala-Fear Hypothesis 
L. Amygdala  Disgust experience -20 -6 -24 50  
   -32 -2 -20 2  
R. Amygdala  Disgust experience 26 2 -20 59  
Insula-Disgust Hypothesis        
L. a. insula  Anger experience -44 20 -2 1   
R. a. insula  Disgust perception 42 14 4 4  
   34 20 6 3  
   36 18 2 1  
OFC-Anger Hypothesis        
L. lat OFC 11 Disgust experience -30 36 -18 167  
R. lat OFC 47 Disgust perception 38 22 0 8  
Other regions in the neural reference space  
Core association        
L. entorhinal cortex 34 Disgust experience -26 -6 -20 1  
  Sad experience -24 2 -12 10  
R. entorhinal cortex 34 Anger perception 16 -10 -16 23  
DMPFC 9 Sad experience 2 50 38 1  
Executive control        
L. DLPFC 9 Anger perception -52 14 24 27  
R. DLPFC 9 Anger perception 54 22 28 130  
R. VLPFC 44 Disgust perception 46 20 10 66  
Exteroceptive Sensory Processing        
R. parastriate 18 Anger perception 52 -76 -2 2  
   48 -76 0 1  
   42 -86 2 3  
  Fear experience 8 -96 4 10  
L. occipitotemporal 37 Disgust experience -46 -58 -14 1  
   -42 -58 -10 1  
R. occipitotemporal 37 Fear experience 48 -72 2 127  
  Anger perception 44 -56 -24 1  
   38 -52 -14 6  
L. middle temporal 21 Fear experience -52 -70 8 72  
R. middle temporal 21 Sad experience 52 -10 -16 2  
Other        
R. SMA 6 Anger perception 44 -2 56 1  
R. putamen  Sad experience 26 4 -4 1  
   28 8 -2 3  
   22 4 -2 1  
PAG  Sad experience 0 -38 -10 1  
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Table 9. Brain Regions Significantly More Active for a Category in the Relative  Analyses  
Region  BA Threshold Contrast Coordinates (MNI) Volume (voxels) 
     x y z   
Amygdala-Fear Hypothesis  
L. Amygdala   Height Disgust experience -32 -2 -20 2  
     -20 -4 -22 124  
    Fear perception -30 -2 -24 1  
     -24 -2 -12 360  
    Sad perception -30 -4 -20 1  
R. Amygdala   Height Disgust experience 26 0 -22 121  
    Fear perception 24 -4 -12 250  
Insula-Disgust Hypothesis  
L. a. insula   Height Anger experience -42 22 -2 2   
   Extent Disgust perception -26 22 -12 252  
R. a. insula/R. lat. OFC   Height Disgust perception 38 20 4 37  
OFC-Anger Hypothesis  
L. lat OFC  11 Height Disgust experience -30 36 -18 167  
Core association          
L. dorsal entorhinal  34 Height Disgust experience -16 2 -16 1  
     -18 0 -14 1  
   Height Sad experience -24 2 -12 19  
L. hippocampus   Height Sad perception -28 -10 -20 1  
R. dorsal entorhinal  34 Height Anger perception 18 -12 -16 27  
   Height Fear perception 14 -6 -12 1  
DMPFC  9 Extent Happy experience -2 44 20 324  
   Height Sad experience 2 50 38 1  
Executive control          
R. VLPFC  44 Height Disgust perception 46 18 10 71  
L. DLPFC  9 Height Anger perception -52 12 24 27  
R. DLPFC  9 Height Anger perception 54 22 28 130  
Exteroceptive Sensory Processing  
R. parastriate  18 Height Anger perception 52 -76 -2 2  
     48 -76 0 1  
     42 -86 2 3  
   Height Fear experience 8 -96 4 10  
L. peristriate  19 Extent Anger perception -48 -80 -8 197  
L. occipitotemporal  37 Height Disgust experience -44 -58 -12 7  
   Extent Anger perception -44 -54 -20 232  
     -50 -62 6 254  
R. occipitotemporal  37 Height Anger perception 44 -56 -24 1  
     40 -56 -20 1  
     40 -54 -14 7  
L. middle temporal  21 Height Fear experience -52 -70 8 72  
   Extent Sad perception -66 -48 8 323  
R. middle temporal  21  Sad experience 52 -10 -16 2  
Uncus   Height Fear perception -30 4 -22 5  
Other          
R. SMA  6 Height Anger perception 44 -2 56 1  
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R. putamen   Height Sad experience 26 4 -4 1  
     28 8 -2 3  
     22 4 -2 1  
PAG   Height Sad experience 0 -38 -10 1  
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Table 10. Logistic Regression Analyses 
Region voxels BA threshold Predictors Coefficient Dir. Odds Model fit 
     β p   χ2 p 
           
L. amygdala [-20, -4, -16] 1259  Height Experience disgust 1.08 <.003 + 2.95 36.11 <.0001 
    Perception fear .75 <.001 + 2.12   
    Perception anger -.76 <.02 - 2.15   
    Experience fear -2.18 <.003 + 8.89   
    Recall -.54 <.05 - 1.71   
    Mental Imagery -1.21 <.07 - 3.35   
R. amygdala [22, -4, -16] 919  Height High arousal .22 <.03 + 1.25 4.93 <.03 
L. a. insula* [-40, 26, -6] 173  Height Experience anger 1.23 <.04 + 3.41 4.12 <.04 
L. mid. insula [-38, 8, -8] 193  Extent Experience anger 1.33 <.03 + 3.80 4.53 <.03 
R. a. insula [48, 12, 0] 28  Extent Evaluation, feelings .63 <.04 + 1.87 4.06 <.04 
R. lat. OFC [44, 26, 0] 6 47 Height Perception disgust 1.18 <.04 + 7.17 10.64 <.005 
    Auditory stimuli 1.97 <.004 + 3.26   
L. lat. OFC [-42, 28, -8] 191 47 Extent Experience anger 1.42 <.04 + 4.14 15.35 <.002 
    Auditory stimuli 1.26 <.03 + 3.54   
    Picture stimuli .97 <.01 + 2.63   
R. lat. OFC [42, 24, -4] 286 47 Extent Perception disgust 1.68 <.001 + 5.36 24.35 <.0001 
    Experience disgust .56 <.09 + 1.75   
    Auditory stimuli 1.53 <.014 + 4.63   
    Mode, experience .39 <.01 + 1.48   
    High arousal .34 <.03 + 1.41   
dACC** [3, 20, -2] 31 32 Extent Cognitive load .76 <.03 + 2.14 15.47 <.0002 
    Evaluation, feelings .66 <.09 + 1.93   
dACC** [0, 38, 6] 62 32 Extent Recall .88 <.05 + 2.50 9.99 <.01 
DMPFC [-6, 48, 34] 171 9 Extent Mode, perception -.36 <.03 - 1.43 10.66 <.004 
    High arousal -.26 <.07 - 1.30   
DMPFC [2, 42, 44] 38 9 Extent Mode, perception -.48 <.02 + 1.62 6.20 <.01 
DMPFC [-6, 40, 32] 21 9 Extent High arousal -.31 <.05 - 1.37 3.87 <.05 
DMPFC/d.ACC [2, 46, 14] 52 9/32 Extent Recall 2.54 <.003 + 34.57 14.44 <.002 
    Mode, perception .73 <.035 + 2.07   
    Film stimuli 1.72 <.08 + 5.60   
DMPFC/dACC [-6, 44, 24] 140 9/32 Extent High arousal -.49 <.001 - 1.63 22.95 <.0001 
    Mode, perception -.35 <.02 - 1.41   
    Perception disgust 1.08 <.05 + 2.94   
    Cognitive load .36 <.06 + 1.43   
L. dorsal entorhinal [-12, 4, -18] 72 34 Extent Perception fear .50 <.05 + 1.65 5.46 <.02 
R. dorsal entorhinal [12, 24, -18] 80 34 Extent Perception fear .64 <.02 + 1.89 7.50 <.01 
L. hippocampus [-32, -8, -20] 91  Extent Perception fear 1.12 <.001 + 3.07 18.19 <.001 
    Perception anger -1.25 <.03 - 3.51   
R. hippocampus [30, -12, -16] 70  Extent Mode, perception .39 <.02 + 1.47 14.48 <.001 
L. VLPFC [-42, 16, 12] 114 44 Extent Experience anger 2.19 <.01 + 8.89 27.88 <.0001 
    Foregrounded affect .52 <.01 + 1.68   
    Perception disgust 1.50 <.001 + 4.48   
    Face stimuli .25 <.07 + 1.28   
R. VLPFC [48, 22, 14] 160 45 Height Auditory stimuli 1.78 <.04 + 6.04 3.54 <.06 
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R. VLPFC [46, 28, 10] 241 44 Extent Perception disgust 1.79 <.001 + 5.97 16.23 <.0001 
L. a. temporal [-34, 14, 20] 260 38 Extent Mode, perception -.26 <.05 - 1.29 11.08 <.01 
    Experience anger 1.07 <.08 + 2.92   
    Negative valence .15 <.10 + 1.16   
R. a temporal [40, 14, -22] 78 38 Extent Mode, perception -1.21 <.0001 - 3.34 34.51 <.0001 
    Auditory stimuli 2.40 <.001 + 11.07   
    Evaluation, stimulus 1.02 <.001 + 2.78   
    Pictures -1.36 <.011 - 3.88   
    Personal events .91 <.09 + 2.49   
    Perception fear -.59 <.01 - 1.87   
L. DLPFC [-46, 16, 24] 202 9 Height Mode, perception .76 <.003 + 2.14 30.25 <.0001 
    Foregrounded affect .57 <.011 + 1.80   
    Perception anger 1.13 <.003 + 3.09   
    Perception fear -.63 <.033 - .1.87   
R. DLPFC [46, 10, 30] 6 9 Height Evaluation, stimulus .73 <.05 + 2.07 5.20 <.02 
L. DLPFC [-40, 18, 26] 110 46 Extent Mode, perception .56 <.003 + 1.76 15.86 <.001 
    Foregrounded affect .64 <.01 + 1.90   
    Perception anger .61 <.09 + 1.84   
PAG [-14, -28, -2] 4  Height High arousal .62 <.06 + 1.87 9.76 <.001 
    Imagery -4.94 <.001 - 140.32   
PAG [-2, -30, -6] 109  Extent Experience fear 1.88 <.003 + 6.61 27.69 <.0001 
    Evaluation, stimulus .92 <.015 + 2.52   
    Auditory stimuli 1.54 <.07 + 4.68   
    Visual methods -.78 <.001 - 2.17   
    Personal events -1.60 <.01 - 4.94   
    Cognitive load -.34 <.06 - 1.42   
L. peristriate [-48, -68, 8] 77 19 Height Experience happiness 3.96 <.002 + 52.93 28.61 <.001 
    Foregrounded affect 2.56 <.001 + 13.13   
    Evaluation, stimulus .56 <.04 + 1.75   
    Film stimuli .50 <.03 + 1.64   
    Unpleasant affect .34 <.06 + 1.41   
R. peristriate [50, -74, 4] 186 19 Extent Experience fear 1.72 <.032 + 5.57 54.85 <.0001 
    Perception disgust 1.16 <.05 + 3.18   
    Picture stimuli 9.57 <.002 + 140,000   
    Mode, perception 4.69 <.004 +  108.87   
    Visual methods 2.47 <.07 + 11.88   
    Face stimuli -3.88 <.001 - 48.53   
    Experience disgust -1.86 <.003 - 6.42   
L. occipitotemporal [-42, -58, 18] 462 37 Height Evaluation, stimulus .65 <.01 + 1.91 40.93 <.0001 
    Visual method 2.11 <.04 + 8.26   
    Cognitive load -.51 <.001 - 1.66   
R. occipitotemporal [42, -54, 20] 437 37 Height Mode, perception .42 <.01 + 1.51 17.20 <.001 
    Personal event stimuli -.77 <.03 - 2.16   
    Cognitive load -.77 <.03 - 1.34   
R. occipitotemporal [48, -66, 4] 249 37 Height Experience fear 2.01 <.009 + 7.48 56.77 <.0001 
    Perception disgust 1.71 <.003 + 5.54   
    Mode, perception 3.08 <.001 + 21.94   
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    Film stimuli 7.84 <.0002 + 561.83   
    Picture stimuli 6.59 <.0001 + 729.79   
    Experience disgust -1.24 <.04 + 3.44   
    Mental imagery 2.87 <.03 + 17.58   
R. middle temporal [50, 2, -18] 18 21 Height Perception fear 1.06 <.014 + 2.89 14.91 <.002 
    Mental imagery 1.85 <.016 + 6.37   
    Film stimuli 1.12 <.06 + 3.06   
Note: Odds are the likelihood of an independent variable predicting activation in a given cluster. Odds are determined by 
dividing the probability of one outcome by the probability of another. The column Dir. refers to the directionality of the 
findings. + denotes odds of predicting activation; - denotes odds of failing to predict activation. *this cluster extended 
partially into the L. lat. OFC ** the vACC did not appear in the height-based or most stringent threshold of the neural 
reference space so I did not investigate this region 
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